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 1925 
MARCHAND v. BARNHILL’S IMPACT ON 
THE DUTY OF OVERSIGHT: NEW FACTORS 
TO ASSESS DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR 
BREACHING THE DUTY OF OVERSIGHT 
Abstract: In 2019, in Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court re-
versed the dismissal of a complaint alleging that the defendants, Blue Bell direc-
tors, breached their duty of oversight. In doing so, the court invoked two new 
factors—whether the corporation is monoline and whether it is heavily regulat-
ed—to consider when evaluating claims against directors for an oversight failure. 
These factors inform whether a court can identify an essential compliance con-
cern, such that a court can infer the directors violated their obligation to act in 
good faith by consciously disregarding a known duty. This inference allows a 
court to find that a plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for a breach of 
the duty of oversight. This Note examines the upper and lower boundaries of the 
monoline as well as heavily regulated factors established in Marchand via a de-
rivative complaint against The Boeing Company’s directors. Ultimately, this 
Note isolates factors most important for a plaintiff to consider when evaluating 
the strength of their breach of the duty of oversight claim, including (1) whether 
the company makes only one product or has one product that is particularly sig-
nificant to the company’s success and (2) whether one, primary, external regula-
tor governs the company’s business. 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 25, 2019, Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (Blue Bell) an-
nounced the return of its ice cream to grocery stores in Virginia.1 This news 
brought particular joy to my family of Texans who celebrated when Blue Bell’s 
ice cream originally came to Virginia and lamented when Blue Bell recalled its 
products after the outbreak of Listeria monocytogenes (Listeria) infections in 
2015.2 This outbreak took three lives and caused at least ten infections.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Press Release, Blue Bell Creameries, Blue Bell Ice Cream Returns to Richmond, Hampton 
Roads and Surrounding Cities Today (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.bluebell.com/press_releases/blue-
bell-ice-cream-returns-to-richmond-hampton-roads-and-surrounding-cities-today/ [https://perma.cc/
N5PC-5Y4D]; see Gregory J. Gillian, Blue Bell Ice Cream Returning to Stores in Richmond and 
Elsewhere in Virginia Beginning This Week, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 25, 2019), https://
www.richmond.com/business/blue-bell-ice-cream-returning-to-stores-in-richmond-and/article_da49
d6d7-cd15-58e9-9989-8a13d5892fae.html [https://perma.cc/29SY-BYDN] (noting the three-year 
period where Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (Blue Bell) ice cream was not available in grocery 
stores in Virginia after the recall). 
 2 See Zeke Hartner, Blue Bell Ice Cream Returns to Virginia After 3-Year Absence, WASH. TOP 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://wtop.com/virginia/2019/03/blue-bell-ice-cream-returns-to-virginia-
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Following the outbreak, the plaintiffs, Blue Bell shareholders, brought a de-
rivative suit against the Blue Bell board of directors.4 Pursuant to In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation, which established the duty of oversight 
in a Delaware Chancery Court case in 1996, the plaintiffs alleged that the Blue 
Bell board of directors breached their duty of oversight by failing to make a 
good faith attempt to institute a monitoring system for the corporation.5 Histori-
cally, shareholder derivative suits did not survive the corporation’s motion to 
dismiss for failing to state a claim of a breach of a duty of oversight due to the 
significant decision-making deference afforded to the boards of corporations.6 
Consequently, the court’s denial of Blue Bell’s board’s motion to dismiss dis-
rupted corporate law with the first successful “Caremark claim.”7 
                                                                                                                           
after-3-year-absence/ [https://perma.cc/2G3B-G6DK] (noting the fans of the ice cream brand). A 
Listeria outbreak is a colloquial term used to explain when the bacterium, Listeria monocytogenes, 
contaminates food and causes listeriosis. Listeria (Listeriosis), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/
index.html [https://perma.cc/8HYM-AK3N]. Listeria is an infection common in pregnant women, 
newborns, adults over sixty-five, and people with compromised immune systems. Id. The symptoms 
are wide-ranging and include fever, nausea, chills, diarrhea, and also may impact the nervous system. 
Listeria Infection, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/listeria-infection/
symptoms-causes/syc-20355269?page=0&citems=10 [https://perma.cc/E9V8-EDG6]; see infra note 
137 and accompanying text (explaining the symptoms of listeriosis). 
 3 Angela Spivey et al., The Blue Bell Ice Cream Listeria Outbreak and Its Fallout, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2019/08/the-blue-bell-ice-cream-Listeria-
outbreak-and-its-fallout/ [https://perma.cc/72TG-KW4Y]. 
 4 See generally Verified Stockholder Derivative Action Complaint, Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 
A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (No. 2017-0586) (alleging the Blue Bell directors’ oversight failure). 
 5 Id. at 57; see infra note 77–126 and accompanying text (explaining the development of the duty 
of oversight via In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation and its progeny). In 1996, in 
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained 
that the board is responsible for overseeing the company so long as the duty does not go so far as to 
require the board to establish a “system of espionage.” 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996). Employees 
of Caremark International, Inc. (Caremark) had allegedly violated federal law by accepting referral 
payments in a health care context. Id. at 961–62. 
 6 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807 (alleging directors breached their fiduciary duties). See general-
ly In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (articulating the elements for assessing oversight liability for direc-
tors); Spivey et al., supra note 3 (describing the board’s oversight failures generally). A claim alleging 
a failure to fulfill a duty of oversight is frequently referred to as a “Caremark claim.” See Marchand, 
212 A.3d at 807–08 (describing the failure to oversee Blue Bell’s food safety operations as a breach of 
duty under a Caremark claim); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (describing 
the allegations in the derivative complaint, and referring to them as Caremark violations). This Note 
also refers to a claim alleging a breach of a duty of oversight as a “Caremark claim.” See, e.g., 
Marchand, 212 A.3d at 808, 820 (using the phrase “Caremark claim”); Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s 
Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 33 (2013) (same); Todd Haugh, Caremark’s Behavioral Leg-
acy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 611, 618 (2018) (same); Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Caremark’s Hidden Prom-
ise, 51 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 239, 242 (2018) (same); Joseph W. Swanson, Yellow Flags Are Not Red 
Flags: Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Caremark Claim in Reiter v. Fairbank, 27 CLASS AC-
TIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS 9, 9 (2017) (same). 
 7 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820, 824 (explaining that alleging and proving a Caremark claim is 
challenging for plaintiffs, but finding that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to deny the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss). See generally In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (establishing the Caremark claim). 
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1927 
On June 20, 2019, in Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court 
denied the motion to dismiss a derivative action against Blue Bell directors for 
failing to fulfill their duty of oversight.8 Emphasizing that regulatory compli-
ance was so essential for Blue Bell’s success, such that the board’s alleged 
failure to act when facing “red flags” concerning the product’s safety could 
rise to the level of an oversight failure, the court held that the derivative suit 
could survive a motion to dismiss.9 This Note discusses how Marchand altered 
corporate directors’ oversight responsibilities in certain industries by placing 
more emphasis on whether a business has a monoline structure and whether it 
has one primary regulator.10 Furthermore, this Note argues that the holding in 
Marchand will have significant implications for directors managing industries 
uniquely capable of causing irreparable harm.11 To illustrate the impact of this 
decision, this Note analyzes a derivative action against The Boeing Company 
(Boeing) to demonstrate how courts may apply Marchand in future claims for 
a breach of the duty of oversight.12 
On October 29, 2018, and March 10, 2019, two 737 MAX planes crashed 
and killed 346 people.13  Both incidents occurred because the planes’ automatic 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See 212 A.3d at 824 (reversing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding that the plaintiff did 
not plead facts to support a Caremark claim). 
 9 Id. at 820. 
 10 See infra notes 156–190 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 156–190 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 191–274 and accompanying text; see also Tom Hals & Tracy Rucinski, Lawsuit 
Against Boeing Seeks to Hold Board Liable for 737 MAX Problems, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-boeing-737max-lawsuit-board/lawsuit-against-boeing-seeks-to-hold-board-liable-for-
737-max-problems-idUSKBN1XS2I3 [https://perma.cc/A5DH-ZFK3] (Nov. 18, 2018) (noting that 
the plaintiff accused the board of failing to investigate 737 MAX safety); Matthew Yglesias, The 
Emerging 737 Max Scandal, Explained, VOX (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.vox.com/business-and-
finance/2019/3/29/18281270/737-max-faa-scandal-explained [https://web.archive.org/web/20210516
140419/https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance/2019/3/29/18281270/737-max-faa-scandal-
explained] (detailing the 737 MAX crashes). 
 13 Timeline: Boeing 737 Max Jetliner Crashes and Aftermath, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-viz-boeing-737-max-crash-timeline-04022019-story.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210518205309/https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-viz-
boeing-737-max-crash-timeline-04022019-story.html]. The 737 MAX is a commercial plane designed 
as an alternative to a competing Airbus plane, the A320neo. Kent German, 2 Years After Being 
Grounded, the Boeing 737 Max Is Flying Again, CNET (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.cnet.com/news/
boeing-737-max-8-all-about-the-aircraft-flight-ban-and-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/T5VS-BDSU]. 
The first flight, which flew from Indonesia, crashed into the sea less than thirteen minutes after taking 
off, killing 189 people. Sinéad Baker, This Timeline Shows Exactly What Happened on Board the 
Lion Air Boeing 737 Max That Crashed in Less Than 13 Minutes, Killing 189 People, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/lion-air-crash-timeline-boeing-737-max-disaster-
killed-189-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/C53R-DX4Y]. The crash report showed the pilots’ persistent 
efforts to prevent the plane’s computer from causing a nosedive into the ocean. Id. The second flight, 
which flew from Ethiopia, also crashed soon after take-off, killing 157 people. Ethiopian Airlines Plane 
Crash: No Survivors Among 157 on Board, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2019/03/ethiopian-airlines-flight-nairobi-crashes-deaths-reported-190310082515738.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q933-ADCV]. 
1928 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1925 
safety systems forced the planes’ noses downward.14 By March 13, 2019, the 
United States grounded all Boeing 737 MAX jets.15 These accidents resulted in 
a multi-billion-dollar loss for Boeing—its first reported loss since 1997.16 
On November 18, 2019, Kirby Family Partnership, an investor in Boeing, 
filed a derivative complaint on behalf of Boeing against its board of direc-
tors.17 The complaint alleged that the board ignored warning signs and failed to 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Darryl Campbell, The Many Human Errors That Brought Down the Boeing 737 Max, THE VERGE 
(May 2, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-human-
error-mcas-faa [https://perma.cc/56CM-YLJE]; William Langewiesche, What Really Brought Down the 
Boeing 737 Max?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-
crashes.html [https://perma.cc/4F7G-SHJG] (Jan. 9, 2021); Todd Shields et al., Boeing 737 MAX 
Crashed After System Forced Its Nose Down ‘Uncommanded,’ Ethiopia Says, TIME (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://time.com/5564224/ethiopia-boeing-737-max-crash-report/ [https://perma.cc/9ELR-J8A8]; Time-
line: Boeing 737 Max Jetliner Crashes and Aftermath, supra note 13 (describing the pilots’ attempts 
to manage a sudden decline in the plane’s nose). 
 15 Hals & Rucinski, supra note 12 (describing the worldwide grounding of The Boeing Company 
(Boeing) 737 MAX jets); Leslie Josephs & Kevin Breuninger, US Grounds Boeing 737 Max Planes, 
Citing Links Between 2 Fatal Crashes, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/13/boeing-shares-fall-
after-report-says-us-expected-to-ground-737-max-fleet.html [https://perma.cc/B5QL-VQFA] (Mar. 
14, 2019); Thomas Kaplan et al., Boeing Planes Are Grounded in U.S. After Days of Pressure, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/business/canada-737-max.html [https://
perma.cc/W6L3-BDUC]; Timeline: Boeing 737 Max Jetliner Crashes and Aftermath, supra note 13. 
As of March 2021, some airlines in the United States have started flying 737 MAX planes again; 
however, some countries continue to have safety concerns and will not fly the planes. See Niraj Chok-
shi, United Adds to Its Orders for Boeing 737 Max Planes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/03/01/business/united-airlines-boeing-737-max.html [https://perma.cc/FK6W-
MULJ] (explaining that United Airlines recently began to fly the 737 MAX again and thus ordered 
more planes for its fleet). But see Orange Wang, Boeing 737 MAX: China’s Flight Ban Won’t Be 
Lifted Until Safety Concerns ‘Properly Addressed,’ CHINA MACRO ECON. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://
www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3123635/boeing-737-max-chinas-flight-ban-wont-
be-lifted-until-safety [https://perma.cc/6QUH-PD6E] (stating that China will continue its ban on the 
737 MAX until Boeing fixes its safety concerns). 
 16 Ankit Ajmera & Eric M. Johnson, Boeing Abandons Outlook, Takes $1 Billion Cost Hit in 
MAX Crisis, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-results/boeing-
abandons-outlook-takes-1-billion-cost-hit-in-max-crisis-idUSKCN1S01GP [https://perma.cc/Z93L-
9SCH] (describing Boeing’s first quarter losses in 2019); Associated Press, Boeing Posts First Annual 
Loss Since 1997, Expects 737 Max Costs to Top $18 Billion, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.
latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-29/boeing-annual-loss-737-max [https://web.archive.org/web/
20200131130433/https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-29/boeing-annual-loss-737-max]; 
Doug Cameron & Andrew Tangel, Boeing Posts Full-Year Loss Amid 737 MAX Setbacks, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-falls-to-full-year-loss-11580302091 [https://
perma.cc/QBL7-YLSG] (reporting a loss of at least $19 billion resulting from the 737 MAX crisis). 
 17 Public Version of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint at 1, Kirby Fam. P’ship, LP 
v. Muilenburg, 2020 WL 4504307 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2020) (No. 2019-0907); see infra note 4738 and 
accompanying context (describing derivative suits). The Kirby Family Partnership became a stock-
holder of Boeing in 2018. Public Version of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra, at 
1. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted motions to intervene submitted by the Construction and 
General Building Laborers’ Local Union No. 79 General Fund, the Cleveland Bakers, and the Team-
sters Pension Fund. Slotoroff v. Bradway, Nos. 2019-0941, 2019-0907, 2019-0794, 2020 WL 474680, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 28, 2020). The court has since consolidated the Kirby Family Partnership, LP v. 
Muilenburg Complaint (Kirby Complaint) with other derivative actions, such as complaints brought 
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1929 
fulfill its oversight obligations following the first crash.18 The court since con-
solidated it with other derivative complaints against Boeing to create In re the 
Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation.19 This Note uses the Marchand decision to 
predict how the court will analyze the alleged failure to maintain oversight in 
In re the Boeing Co.20 This Note argues that the Marchand decision strength-
ens the plaintiffs’ position in In re the Boeing Co. and may result in the court 
denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.21 Finally, this Note isolates im-
portant factors to evaluate when assessing the likelihood of a complaint’s dis-
missal, which can guide practitioners bringing derivative complaints and ex-
plain to corporate boards which elements of their business may make them 
vulnerable to derivative litigation post-Marchand.22 
Part I of this Note describes the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, 
which are the fiduciary duties that corporate directors must uphold.23 Part I 
further explains how the duty of good faith factors into the duties of care and 
loyalty as an element of liability for the breach of the duty of loyalty.24 Part I 
additionally explains the development of the duty of oversight as established in 
                                                                                                                           
on behalf of retirement funds invested in Boeing, establishing In re the Boeing Co. Derivative Litiga-
tion. Kirby Fam. P’ship, 2020 WL 4504307, at *1. 
 18 Public Version of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 23. 
 19 Kirby Fam. P’ship, 2020 WL 4504307, at *1. The plaintiffs in In re the Boeing Co. Derivative 
Litigation filed a consolidated complaint (Boeing Complaint) on January 5, 2021. See generally Veri-
fied Amended Consolidated Complaint, In re the Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., No. 2019-0907 (Del. 
Ch. filed Jan. 5, 2021), 2021 WL 496766 (alleging that Boeing officers inadequately monitored Boe-
ing 737 MAX’s safety). This Note relies on the Kirby Complaint and Boeing Complaint when analyz-
ing the oversight failures attributed to the 737 MAX disaster. See generally Verified Amended Con-
solidated Complaint, supra, at 9 (alleging oversight failures after gaining more access to records); 
Public Version of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 9 (alleging over-
sight failures without extensive access to records). The Boeing Complaint outlines the interaction 
between Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after a prolonged series of records 
requests. See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra, at 7 (describing Boeing’s efforts to 
reduce costs by asserting that the 737 MAX was similar to Boeing’s original 737 plane, thus reducing 
the FAA’s involvement and required pilot training); Rose Krebs, Chancery Pauses Boeing 737 Suits 
Amid Records Blitz, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1236044/chancery-
pauses-boeing-737-suits-amid-records-bid-blitz [https://perma.cc/8WAZ-9TLM]. 
 20 See infra notes 208–264 and accompanying text. 
 21 See generally Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (introducing a new 
understanding of a Caremark claim for heavily regulated, monoline corporations, and imposing a 
more onerous oversight burden on directors of corporations within that category); Defendants’ Open-
ing Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 1–4, In re the Boeing Co., No. 2019-0907 (Del. Ch. 
filed Feb. 8, 2021), 2021 WL 530962 (seeking dismissal based on plaintiffs’ failure to successfully 
plead defendants’ failure to implement a monitoring process and ignorance of warning signs); Veri-
fied Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 9 (alleging a claim for breach of duty of 
oversight after the board supposedly ignored red flags of a compliance breakdown, and emphasizing 
the 737 MAX’s significance in Boeing’s business to establish criteria fulfilling the monoline de-
scriptor in Marchand v. Barnhill). 
 22 See infra notes 265–274 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 31–55 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 56–76 and accompanying text. 
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In re Caremark.25 Finally, Part I explores how these fiduciary duties inform the 
duty of oversight.26 Part II discusses Marchand as the first well-pled Caremark 
claim, emphasizing how the monoline nature of Blue Bell’s business influ-
enced the court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss.27 Part III examines 
the upper and lower boundaries of the factors established in Marchand, namely 
evaluating whether the corporation meets the monoline and whether it is heavi-
ly regulated criteria, meaning a “mission critical” compliance concern is iden-
tifiable.28 Part III also considers the implications of Marchand by applying these 
factors to the facts alleged in In re the Boeing Co., predicting that the court will 
likely deny a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for the breach of the 
duty of oversight.29 Finally, Part III summarizes the key factors that potential 
plaintiffs should consider in a breach of the duty of oversight claim.30 
I. CORPORATE DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES & THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE DUTY OF OVERSIGHT
The duties of care and loyalty serve as the dominant sources of liability
for corporate directors.31 In the early 2000s, legal observers reacted to the Del-
aware courts’ rhetoric regarding good faith by asserting that the duty of good 
faith should serve as an independent basis for director liability.32 Despite this 
25 See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 99–126 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 127–190 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 191–207 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 208–264 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 265–274 and accompanying text. 
31 BRIAN J.M. QUINN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 280 (6th ed. 2019) (defin-
ing the duty of care as obligating the director to use the care of a reasonably prudent director and the 
duty of loyalty as requiring the director to pursue the corporation’s best interests in good faith); An-
drew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 464 (2009) 
(highlighting the traditional duties of care and loyalty and questioning where good faith fits among 
them); Nicholas D. Mozal, Why the Delaware Courts Express Two, and Only Two, Fiduciary Duties: 
A Response to How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 
(2010), 87 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 156, 156–57 (2014), http://www.ramllp.com/media/article/
68_Mozal%20USC%20Law%20Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB63-58UW] (explaining the court’s 
articulation of the duties of care and loyalty in Stone v. Ritter, and arguing that consolidating duties 
better applies corporate law’s objectives to directors and would have greater social impact); Hillary A. 
Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 463 (2004) (including good faith in the de-
scription of three fiduciary duties); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining 
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 631 (2010) (identifying care and loyalty as 
directors’ conventional fiduciary duties); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in 
Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2010) (suggesting that the two primary fiduciary 
duties are care and loyalty). 
 32 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1 
(2006) (highlighting the importance of fleshing out the nuances of the duty of good faith); Gold, supra 
note 31, at 464 (explaining the evolution of fiduciary duties in corporate law). One scholar discusses 
the idea of the duty of good faith as its own source of director liability rather than a subsidiary element 
of the duty of loyalty. See Sale, supra note 31, at 482 (noting that Delaware cases discuss the duty of 
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1931 
advocacy, Delaware courts continued to rely on the duties of care and loyalty 
as the claims necessary to attach liability to corporate directors.33 For example, 
in 2006 in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly described the 
duty of good faith as an elemental obligation within the duty of loyalty, not a 
cause of action on its own.34 
The duties of care and loyalty stem from corporate directors’ fiduciary ob-
ligations to the corporation for which they serve on the board.35 Those with a 
fiduciary responsibility must act in the beneficiary’s interest.36 The duty of care 
protects the beneficiary’s interest by requiring directors to make decisions on 
an informed basis and with the diligence that a person with the same training 
and skills would typically have in the relevant circumstances.37 Although this 
                                                                                                                           
good faith separately). This development triggered significant scholarly discussion calling for a more 
robust duty of good faith. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of 
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (noting references to the duty of 
good faith along with duties of care and loyalty); John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and 
the Ability of Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense 
to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 111, 140 (2004) (calling for the clarification of the duty of good faith in response to the 
power of exculpation provisions, which eliminate damages for breach of fiduciary duties other than 
duties of loyalty and failing to act in good faith); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in 
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 495–96 
(2004) (identifying confusion regarding whether good faith is an independent duty capable of creating 
liability). 
 33 See Mozal, supra note 31, at 160–61 (relying on Stone to explain that the Delaware Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether good faith was an independent basis for liability, and noting 
that the threat of liability has not increased with the reliance on duties of care and loyalty). 
 34 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (describing good faith as a condition necessary for 
liability, such that “a failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct 
imposition of fiduciary liability”); see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (describing a violation of good faith as a precondition for liability). In 2006, in Stone 
v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court’s assertion that good faith is a perquisite for the duty of loyalty 
relied on a footnote in the 2003 Delaware Court of Chancery case Guttman v. Huang, which explains 
that it is necessary to act in good faith to act loyally and it is impossible to behave in bad faith and still 
fulfill the duty of loyalty. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 & nn. 30 & 34 (citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.3d 
492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). Consequently, there is no use in separating the duty of good faith 
from the duty of loyalty. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34. 
 35 Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDU-
CIARY LAW 61, 71 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
 36 John C.P. Goldberg, The Fiduciary Duty of Care, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW, supra note 35, at 405, 405. In the case of a corporation, the directors’ beneficiaries are the 
stockholders. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
407, 412 (explaining directors’ fiduciary obligations to stockholders). 
 37 Goldberg, supra note 36, at 406; Velasco, supra note 35, at 69. The Delaware Supreme Court 
established the minimum conduct required to satisfy the directors’ duty to inform themselves in 1984 
in Aronson v. Lewis. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that directors must stay apprised of 
all reasonably accessible material information), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). In Aronson, the court considered the directors’ approval of an employment 
agreement, which included $225,000 in loans without interest, with a director and stockholder. Id. at 
808–09. The plaintiff, a stockholder of the company, alleged that such an agreement in no way bene-
fited the corporation. Id. at 809.  
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standard of conduct requires the directors to act with ordinary care, the appli-
cable standard of review for a care claim requires a plaintiff to allege that a 
director acted with gross negligence.38 Thus, if a director fulfills their obliga-
tions under the duty of care, they are not subject to liability on the basis of a 
care violation even if the decision resulted in an undesirable outcome for the 
stockholders.39 This deference to directors is a manifestation of the business 
judgment presumption, which reflects the position that the courts should not 
substitute their business judgment for the director’s business judgment.40 
Stockholders may only overcome this presumption, which assumes that corpo-
rate directors “act[] on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action was taken in the best interests of the company,” by proving gross 
negligence for a care claim or asserting the directors’ conflict of interest.41 
The duty of loyalty requires directors to pursue the corporation’s interest, 
as opposed to the directors’ personal interests or a third-party’s interests.42 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (explaining that director conduct must rise to gross negligence to 
warrant liability due to the deference accorded to directors under the business judgment presumption); 
Velasco, supra note 35, at 68–69 (noting that liability for care claims is uncommon due to this stand-
ard of review). The applicable standard of review informs how the court considers lower court deci-
sions and applies presumptions to alleged facts. Standard of Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). A presumption creates a lens through which the court examines facts, skewing the 
interpretation towards a specific result unless the opposing party defeats the presumption. Presump-
tion, id. In the case of the business judgment presumption, the court defers to directors’ business 
judgment to protect the board’s ability to take risks for the corporation’s benefit and avoid substituting 
the court’s business judgment for that of the board’s. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 
(Del. 1971); Goldberg, supra note 36, at 412. Gross negligence entails the absence of “even slight 
diligence or care.” Gross Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra. Gross negligence captures 
“willful and wanton misconduct” or, more relevant in the context of fiduciary duties, “a conscious, 
voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 39 Goldberg, supra note 36, at 406 (noting that the standard for a duty of care claim is objective); 
see also A. GILCHRIST SPARKS, III, DELAWARE LAW FOR CORPORATE LAWYERS: RECENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS 100 (1985) (explaining that the court will not look at the merits of the board’s decision, 
assuming that the board adhered to its fiduciary obligations in procedure and intent). 
 40 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. 280 A.2d at 720 (emphasizing how directors benefit from the busi-
ness judgment presumption, such that a court “will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not 
sound business judgment.”); see Velasco, supra note 35, at 69–70 (suggesting that the business judg-
ment presumption gives directors discretion to take risks). This presumption insulates directors and 
enables them to make risky decisions that benefit the corporation. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 
412; Velasco, supra note 35, at 63 (describing the policy interest in allowing corporate directors to 
make risky decisions to encourage profit maximization). Overall, the business judgment presumption 
operates in the directors’ favor when assessing liability. See SPARKS, supra note 39, at 102 (noting the 
business judgment presumption’s effects). 
 41 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 35, at 385, 385 (explaining that most loyalty claims 
base liability in the directors’ self-dealing or conflicting duties). 
 42 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (defining the duty of loyalty as 
directors’ fiduciary obligation to prioritize the corporation and stockholders’ interests ahead of the 
directors’ self-interest), modified decision on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (explaining the 
reargument after return of remand without changing duty of loyalty definition); Gold, supra note 41, 
at 387; Velasco, supra note 35, at 66 (noting that the duty of loyalty requires directors to prioritize the 
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When directors’ interests are in conflict with the corporation’s, they must prior-
itize the corporation’s interests, abstain from self-dealing, and decline benefits 
unavailable to stockholders.43 If directors have a conflict of interest, the Dela-
ware statute allows them to absolve their conflict by disclosing it to the disin-
terested board members or the stockholders.44 Disclosure can clear the transac-
tion of director interest, making a loyalty violation claim against a director dif-
ficult. 45 The business judgment presumption creates a high bar for plaintiffs to 
meet when asserting claims for breach of the duty of loyalty.46 Because loyalty 
claims are typically derivative causes of action, a complaint may only survive 
a pre-trial dismissal if it sufficiently alleges the director’s interest in the trans-
action or issue or their lack of independence from an interested party.47 
                                                                                                                           
corporation’s interests over their own); see Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 
MCGILL L.J. 235, 259, 280 (2011) (describing the duty of loyalty as a requirement that directors exer-
cise their discretion exclusively for the benefit of the beneficiary’s interest). 
 43 Sale, supra note 31, at 483. The duty of loyalty also precludes directors from appropriating 
opportunities that would have otherwise benefitted the corporation. Id.; Velasco, supra note 35, at 68. 
 44 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2020); see Sale, supra note 31, at 483. Delaware law gives 
directors an opportunity to disclose their conflicts and allows an interested transaction to move for-
ward through a ratification process. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144; Gold, supra note 41, at 388 (“A 
majority of disinterested, independent directors may approve a conflicting interest transaction, and 
often a decision is delegated to a special committee formed with this aim in mind.”). The directors 
may also seek ratification from stockholders before the transaction. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144; 
Gold, supra note 41, at 388. 
 45 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144; Gold, supra note 41, at 388. 
 46 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1089 (Del. 2001) (en banc) (describing the business 
judgment presumption as an “uphill battle” for plaintiffs); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (emphasizing a 
courts’ regard for the business judgment presumption, and noting that it is a plaintiff’s burden to over-
come it); Sale, supra note 31, at 483 (explaining the procedural requirements for a loyalty claim); see 
also supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing the business judgment presumption). 
 47 Sale, supra note 31, at 483. Loyalty claims are often derivative claims because the corporation 
rather than any one individual suffers the harm. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 
A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004) (en banc). A derivative suit is an action where a stockholder compels the 
corporation to file a suit to vindicate the corporation’s losses or correct the corporate action at issue. 
Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Distinguishing Derivative Claims for Direct 
Claims Under Delaware Law, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS & LITIGATORS MUST KNOW 
ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1293, 1295–96 (2005). Derivative claims are susceptible to 
pretrial dismissal for failing to demand that the board vindicate the corporation’s rights prior to initiat-
ing the derivative action. Id. at 1298 (listing other reasons for pretrial dismissal, including not meeting 
standing requirements, insufficient evidence resulting from the plaintiff’s lack of access to discovery, 
and the corporation’s special litigation committee terminating the suit). The derivative claim must 
seek relief on the corporation’s behalf. Velasco, supra note 35, at 75; Wolfe, supra, at 1298. Defend-
ants frequently move to dismiss a derivative action for not complying with Delaware Court of Chan-
cery Rule 23.1, which requires a plaintiff to either make a demand upon the directors or explain why 
they did not attempt to make a demand. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; QUINN, supra note 31, at 163. The 
requirement stems from the management authority vested in the board by section 141(a) of the Dela-
ware Code. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); QUINN, supra note 31, at 175; Velasco, supra note 35, at 
75. Section 141(a) requires the board to manage the corporation’s legal claims. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(a); QUINN, supra note 31, at 175; Velasco, supra note 35, at 75 (noting that the decision to 
pursue a cause of action on behalf of the corporation belongs to the board). Under section 141(a), the 
directors have the priority to sue on the corporation’s behalf, not the shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. 
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The proliferation of exculpation provisions in certificates of incorporation 
have forced plaintiffs to rely on the duties of loyalty and good faith to hold 
directors liable for breaches of fiduciary duties.48 Title 8, section 102(b)(7) of 
the Delaware Code provides the option to include an exculpation provision in a 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation to eliminate the possibility of money 
damages for a breach of the duty of care.49 These provisions protect disinter-
ested and independent directors from care claims because plaintiffs cannot ful-
fill the requirements of a duty of care violation without alleging damages, and, 
therefore, they cannot survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.50 
                                                                                                                           
tit. 8, § 141(a); QUINN, supra note 31, at 175 (explaining that control over legal claims naturally flows 
from the board’s responsibility to manage the corporation). As a result of the demand requirement, 
stockholders can act on behalf of the corporation in derivative actions only after a plaintiff attempts to 
make a demand on the board or asserts the futility of making a demand on the board. See QUINN, 
supra note 31, at 176 (noting the impracticality of expecting a board to proceed with legal action 
against themselves); Velasco, supra note 35, at 75 (explaining that directors are often the subject of 
the suit and thus plaintiffs cannot trust them to pursue an action against themselves). The Delaware 
Supreme Court established the standard for analyzing the futility of making a demand on the board in 
1984 in Aronson v. Lewis and in 1993 in Rales v. Blasband. See generally Rales v. Blasband, 634 
A.2d 927, 933–35 (Del. 1993); Aronson, 473 A.3d at 814–15. The test in Aronson requires that the 
complaint allege facts creating a reasonable doubt “that: (1) the directors are disinterested and inde-
pendent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business 
judgment.” 473 A.2d at 814. Aronson applies when a plaintiff challenges a specific business decision, 
such as executing an agreement or a transaction. Rales, 634 A.2d at 930. In contrast, the test in Rales 
applies when there is not a specific business decision to challenge but there is questionable conduct to 
allege, such as insider trading. Id. See generally Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(applying Rales to a derivative complaint concerning insider trading). The test articulated in Rales 
analyzes (1) whether the complaint alleged sufficient facts to create a reasonable doubt that the direc-
tors could use their “independent and disinterested business judgment” when evaluating a demand and 
(2) whether directors risked substantial likelihood of liability such that impartially considering a de-
mand became impracticable. Rales, 634 A.2d at 934, 936; see also Guttman, 823 A.2d at 501–02. 
 48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (allowing a corporation to include a provision in its certifi-
cate of incorporation that eliminates damages for breaching a fiduciary duty except for violations of 
the duty of loyalty or an act not in good faith); Mitchell, supra note 6, at 255 (commenting that excul-
pation provisions predominantly ended direct care claims); Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 507 (describ-
ing how exculpation provisions eliminate liability for a breach of the duty of care); Sale, supra note 
31, at 462 (noting that care claims comprise only a small portion of derivative actions); Velasco, su-
pra note 35, at 73 (explaining that exculpation provisions remove liability for care claims, functioning 
like a waiver). 
 49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). The statute allows a corporation’s certificate of incorpora-
tion to include “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director . . . for mone-
tary damages for breach of fiduciary duty . . . .” Id. The language specifically prohibits exculpation for 
a director’s breach of the duty of loyalty or “for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve 
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law . . . .” Id. Therefore, the statute only eliminates 
money damages for a duty of care claim. Id. Exculpation provisions made successful duty of care 
claims essentially impossible by eliminating damages for duty of care violations; thus, plaintiffs can-
not satisfy the elements for stating a claim because most allege damages in the form of money. Velas-
co, supra note 35, at 76. Plaintiffs, however, can still seek injunctive relief for a breach of duty of 
care. Id. 
 50 Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Director Inattention and Director Protection Under Delaware General 
Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7): A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 695, 711 
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As a result of corporations’ adoption of exculpatory provisions, claims 
seeking monetary damages for a breach of the duty of care are no longer viable 
for plaintiffs.51 Instead, plaintiffs must rely on breaches of the duty of loyalty 
and the duty of good faith for recourse.52 Unlike the fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty, the role of good faith remains nebulous.53 Part A of this Section 
explores how good faith operates as a condition for the duty of loyalty.54 Part B 
explains how the duty of oversight developed and describes its relationship to 
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.55 
A. Violating the Duty of Good Faith as a Required Element  
to Establish Director Liability 
Due to the improbability of successful care claims, the only way for 
plaintiffs to capture conduct traditionally within the duty of care is by alleging 
either a breach of the duty of loyalty or alleging that a director acted in bad 
faith.56 Commentators sought to convert care claims into non-exculpable good 
faith claims to avoid barred damages resulting from pervasive exculpation 
provisions.57 
Due to the elusive definition of good faith, it is helpful to understand 
good faith as excluding conduct exercised in bad faith.58 Bad faith conduct ne-
                                                                                                                           
(2008). Where a plaintiff alleges a claim without damages, the defendant can seek dismissal or sum-
mary judgment for failure to state a claim. Id. at 709 n.40. 
 51 Mitchell, supra note 6, at 255; Velasco, supra note 35, at 73. 
 52 Velasco, supra note 35, at 72. 
 53 Id. at 71 (noting that the duties of care and loyalty are two distinct categories of corporate di-
rectors’ fiduciary duties, and explaining good faith’s role either as an independent fiduciary duty or as 
a component of the duty of loyalty). 
 54 In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 760 n.487 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (noting that the duties of care and loyalty sometimes insufficiently protect stockholders, and 
explaining that good faith may fill this space by ensuring directors operate “with an honesty of pur-
pose and with an understanding of whose interests they are there to protect”), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006); see infra notes 56–76 and accompanying text (explaining that the duty of good faith operates 
as a subsidiary of the duty of loyalty). 
 55 See infra notes 77–126 and accompanying text. 
 56 Velasco, supra note 35, at 72. 
 57 QUINN, supra note 31, at 411; see John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and 
Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 53 (2014) (explaining how using the business judgment 
presumption as a benefit to corporations without any “stick” risks misconduct); Hillary A. Sale, Moni-
toring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 724 n.18 (2007) (explaining the rhetorical 
shift to good faith as a response to exculpation provisions); Reed & Neiderman, supra note 32, at 140 
(describing the impact of exculpation clauses). 
 58 See Pat Andriola, Leap of Faith: Determining the Standard of Faith Needed to Violate the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing for Delaware Limited Liability Companies, 58 
B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 1, 3 (2017), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3532
&context=bclr [https://perma.cc/G4T7-A5GL] (defining bad faith as conscious wrongdoing); Eisen-
berg, supra note 32, at 21 (relying on contract law to understand that good faith conduct is conduct 
not in bad faith); Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
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cessitates scienter, meaning that a director acted with intent.59 In 2006, in In re 
the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court articu-
lated the culpability required to establish bad faith conduct.60 In one example, 
the court described conduct where the director intentionally acted to advance 
interests other than the corporation’s.61 Despite this conduct’s similarity to a 
breach of the duty of loyalty, the court used this conduct as an example of a 
failure to act in good faith and emphasized a different part of the director’s 
misconduct—intent.62 The same emphasis applied where a director consciously 
disregarded a known duty, thus failing to act in good faith.63 Although this 
conduct aligns with a violation of the duty of care,64 the court’s analysis fo-
cused on the director’s intentional actions to demonstrate bad faith conduct, 
                                                                                                                           
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968) (describing the use of good 
faith as excluding bad faith). 
 59 Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 454 (2007) (describing good 
faith as “honesty, lack of ill-intentions, fairness, full disclosure, and sincere attempts to honor an obli-
gation”); Velasco, supra note 35, at 71 (asserting that negligence is not enough to establish bad faith 
conduct). According to the Delaware Court of Chancery, acting with scienter in the fiduciary context 
means that the director acted in opposition to their fiduciary duties and that the director knew they 
were doing so. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, 
at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (citing In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., C.A. 
No. 5430, 2011 WL 2176479, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011)). Scienter refers to the requirement that 
an individual act with the necessary knowledge to establish a person as legally accountable for their 
acts or failure to act under the relevant statute. Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38. 
 60 In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). In 2006, 
in In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that the 
Walt Disney Company (Disney) hired Michael Ovitz as the president in 1995. Id. at 35. Just over a 
year after Disney hired Ovitz, Disney terminated him without cause and with a severance package 
valued around $130 million. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Disney’s directors violated their duties of 
care and good faith by approving the employment agreement and the severance payment. Id. at 46. In 
reviewing the board’s process, the Delaware Supreme Court described the relevant committee’s re-
view of the information provided by the expert as “not so tidy.” Id. at 56. Nonetheless, the court con-
cluded that the committee evaluated similar employment and reasonably trusted the expert to compe-
tently provide the committee with guidance for a compensation decision. Id. at 59. Furthermore, the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that Disney’s board acted in good faith throughout its decision to 
hire Ovitz. Id. at 67–68. The court also affirmed the lower court’s interpretation of the facts, which 
determined that Michael Eisner, chairman of the committee and chief executive officer (CEO) of 
Disney, weighed alternatives and knew all material facts before terminating Ovitz. Id. at 36, 73 (citing 
In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 778 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)). 
 61 Id. at 67. 
 62 See id. at 66–67 (analyzing bad faith and inferring that it requires scienter). 
 63 See id. at 67. Disregarding a known duty has similarities with a breach of the duty of care be-
cause uninformed directors prevent themselves from becoming aware of their duties. See In re Care-
mark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (connecting a director’s effort to 
inform themselves to fulfill the duty of attention as an example of good faith). 
 64 See Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67 (using a failure to act as an example of a violation of good faith); 
QUINN, supra note 31, at 280 (defining the duty of loyalty). 
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which it considered more blameworthy.65 The court’s language suggested that 
the director did not negligently breach his fiduciary obligations but purposeful-
ly failed the corporation’s stockholders, which rose to the level of bad faith 
conduct.66 
Corporate directors’ fiduciary obligations create a baseline expectation 
that directors must act in the best interests of the stockholders, but the duty of 
good faith’s concern with intent operates to further impose a moral obligation 
on the directors.67 This moral obligation is context-dependent.68 For example, a 
director sincerely acting in what the director perceives as the stockholders’ best 
interest does not act in good faith when the stockholders’ best interest necessi-
tates a violation of the law.69 
The Delaware Supreme Court most explicitly conveyed its understanding 
of the duty of good faith in Stone v. Ritter.70 According to the court, failing to 
act in good faith does not automatically result in fiduciary liability.71 The court 
cited a decision from the Delaware Chancery Court, which reiterated that good 
faith operates as a subordinate element of the traditional duty of loyalty.72 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67 (describing bad faith to attribute greater emphasis on the state of 
mind of the director). 
 66 See id. (emphasizing the intentionality and culpability aspect of bad faith conduct). 
 67 Nowicki, supra note 59, at 447 (noting that the law obligates directors to manage the corpora-
tion’s business and affairs); see Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric 
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5, 14 (2005) (describing good faith in relation to 
the duties of care and loyalty and interpreting the reference to good faith in section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware Code to consider intent); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2020) (allowing 
corporations to include exculpatory provisions that limit their liability for breaches of the duty of 
care). 
 68 See Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67 (identifying different examples involving good faith). 
 69 Eisenberg, supra note 32 at 31; see Griffith, supra note 32, at 29 (suggesting a definition of a 
violation of good faith as “egregious, subversive, or knowing behavior” (quoting Sale, supra note 31, 
at 488)). 
 70 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (en banc). 
 71 See id. (addressing whether acting in bad faith can serve as its own basis for director liability, 
which the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation left explicit-
ly open). 
 72 Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
In Guttman v. Huang, a 2003 Delaware Chancery Court case, the plaintiff brought a derivative action 
on behalf of a technology corporation, NVIDIA Corporation. 823 A.3d at 493. The plaintiff argued 
that the NVIDIA directors breached their fiduciary duty by “failing to ensure that there was an ade-
quate system of financial controls in place at the company,” which led to the issuance of materially 
misleading financial statements. Id. at 497. After explaining how difficult such Caremark claims are 
to prove, the court in Guttman proceeded to reject the plaintiff’s assertion that directors breached their 
duty of oversight. Id. at 505–08. The court explained that the basis of liability for failure of oversight 
depends on directors’ awareness that they were not fulfilling their jobs. Id. at 506 (explaining how a 
Caremark claim imposes a requirement to act with greater care coupled with a requirement to act in 
good faith, which predicates liability on a demonstration that directors consciously failed to exercise 
care); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, C.A. No. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437, at *39 n.133 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 28, 2003) (sharing the view that the duty of loyalty subsumed the independent duty of good 
faith), aff’d, 840 A.2d 641 (Del. 2003). 
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hough this decision did not recognize the duty of good faith as its own basis of 
liability, the analysis enabled the same outcome of filling the gaps left by tradi-
tional notions of the duties of care and loyalty.73 Despite this potential, the rhe-
torical difference between good faith as an independent duty and good faith as 
a subsidiary element foreshadowed the courts’ hesitance to interpret care viola-
tions as a breach of good faith.74 
By keeping good faith claims within the duty of loyalty, the court left 
open the possibility that a care claim alleging facts so outrageous that the di-
rectors’ culpability rises to bad faith conduct can convert into a loyalty viola-
tion, even if the director did not engage in self-dealing or otherwise prioritize 
another’s interests over the corporation’s.75 Then in 1996, in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery fur-
ther defined how a care claim can convert into a loyalty claim by establishing 
that directors are responsible for overseeing the corporation.76 
B. The Development of the Duty of Oversight 
With exculpation provisions essentially eliminating the ability to success-
fully bring care claims seeking monetary damages, plaintiffs sought other ave-
nues of recourse, such as good faith claims.77 Alleging a breach of the duty of 
good faith allows plaintiffs to address directors who acted without conflicts of 
interests but with processes so inadequate that the conduct exceeded gross neg-
ligence and escalated to a breach of the duty of good faith.78 The legal hook for 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (describing good faith as a necessary element to prove the duty of 
loyalty); Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 5 (explaining how the duty of good faith can fill the space left 
open by the duties of care and loyalty). 
 74 See Griffith, supra note 32, at 18–19 (explaining that the plaintiff’s re-pled in In re the Walt 
Disney Co. relied on an exculpable care claim because a loyalty claim was not available). According 
to Sean J. Griffith, in 2005, the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation “rescue[d]” the plaintiffs’ revised complaint through good faith. Id. at 19. In relying on the 
duty of good faith, the court discussed issues traditionally raised under the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty, suggesting that facts related only to care claims would not have the same result. See id. at 20 
(“[T]hroughout the opinion he applied an analytic technique that essentially alternated between issues 
traditionally raised in analyses under the duty of loyalty, on the one hand, and the duty of care, on the 
other.”). 
 75 Nowicki, supra note 59, at 457. 
 76 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (articulating the duty of oversight). 
 77 QUINN, supra note 31, at 411; see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001) 
(emphasizing that even when plaintiffs defeat the business judgment presumption by alleging a care 
violation amounting to gross negligence, the exculpation provision still affords directors protection); 
In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 754–55 (Del. Ch. 2005) (ex-
plaining the exculpation provisions’ impact, admitting the confusing jurisprudence surrounding good 
faith, and describing intentional disregard of a duty as a violation of good faith and a disloyal act), 
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)); Griffith, supra note 32, at 13 (describing good faith as a limit to ex-
culpatory powers). 
 78 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969–70; QUINN, supra note 31, at 411; see Eisenberg, supra note 
32, at 5 (discussing how the duties of care and loyalty do not include all director misconduct). 
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a breach of the duty of good faith stems from the interpretation of good faith as 
a requirement of the duty of loyalty; thus, plaintiffs showing bad faith could 
demonstrate a breach of the duty of loyalty.79 The duty of oversight became 
entangled with the duty of good faith in In re Caremark because the Delaware 
Court of Chancery used the rhetoric of good faith to establish minimum over-
sight responsibilities for directors.80 Subsection 1 of this Section explores Gra-
ham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., a 1963 case, to provide the context 
precipitating the In re Caremark decision.81 Subsection 2 showcases the difficul-
ty of pleading a Caremark claim and discusses the status of oversight claims pri-
or to the Marchand v. Barnhill, a 2019 decision.82 Subsection 3 explains how 
acting in bad faith goes beyond breaching the duty of care to lay the founda-
tion for Subsection 4,83 which describes how a failure to act in good faith oper-
ates as a condition for establishing oversight liability and a breach of the duty 
of loyalty.84 
1. The Foundation for a Caremark Claim 
In 1963, in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the Delaware 
Supreme Court provided the foundation from which the Delaware Court of 
Chancery later created the oversight duty in In re Caremark.85 The court con-
sidered whether the directors knew or should have known about four employ-
ee’s conduct in violation of antitrust laws.86 The plaintiffs, stockholders in the 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See supra notes 56–76 and accompanying text (discussing good faith as required to fulfill the 
duty of loyalty). 
 80 698 A.2d at 970 (articulating the importance of the directors acting with “good faith judgment” 
to ensure the oversight system is adequate); see Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019) 
(en banc) (explaining that a plaintiff must demonstrate that directors acted in bad faith to successfully 
bring a Caremark claim); Griffith, supra note 32, at 4 (describing good faith as an “amorphous princi-
ple”). 
 81 See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text. See generally Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (establishing the basis for the decision in In re Caremark). 
 82 See infra notes 99–112 and accompanying text. See generally Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820–24 
(denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim of a breach of the duty of oversight). 
 83 See infra notes 113–118 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 113–126 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 (explaining that unless suspicion prompts them, directors do not 
have a duty to seek details to prevent wrongdoing); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 
2006) (en banc) (noting that the concept of an oversight duty was first articulated in Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970–71 (holding that a corporation’s 
board must employ “a good faith effort” to oversee the corporation’s operations via a monitoring 
system designed to provide the board with “appropriation information . . . in a timely manner as a 
matter of ordinary operations”). 
 86 Graham, 188 A.2d at 127 (noting that the indicted employees were not directors). In 1963, in 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the Delaware Supreme Court explained that these 
indictments charged the employees with conspiring to fix prices and manipulate bids. Id. at 128. 
When no evidence supported the contention that directors knew about the misconduct, the plaintiffs’ 
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company, alleged that the directors’ lack of oversight prevented them from 
learning about and stopping the employees’ illicit activities. 87 The court up-
held the lower court ruling that the company’s directors were not liable on this 
basis.88 An important factor in the court’s decision was the absence of facts 
showing that the directors should have been so “on guard” that a need to pre-
vent the antitrust violations was obvious.89 The relevance of these facts, or lack 
thereof, implies that directors can have a duty to prevent misconduct in certain 
circumstances.90 
The Graham decision did not provide specific criteria indicating when di-
rectors have sufficient notice that they should be “on guard” to prevent em-
ployee misconduct.91 The court instead offered insight into when the directors 
do not have an oversight duty.92 Noting that directors have the right to depend 
on employees until they suspect wrongdoing, the court explained that directors 
do not have a duty to implement a system designed to investigate the trustwor-
thiness of its employees.93 
In 2006, in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court outlined two in-
terpretations of the Graham analysis.94 The first —a broad interpretation—is 
that absent any reason to suspect misconduct, directors do not have any duty to 
maintain reporting mechanisms to gather information concerning the corpora-
tion’s material acts altogether.95 The second, a narrower interpretation of Gra-
ham, is that directors are not subject to liability for assuming employees’ hon-
                                                                                                                           
theory of the case shifted to assert that the directors’ misconduct was their failure to know and then 
prevent the employees’ activities. Id. 
 87 Id. at 127. 
 88 Id. at 131 (affirming the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision). 
 89 See id. at 129 (holding that the plaintiffs did not show that the directors had notice of the un-
lawful activity). This reasoning extends to Marchand v. Barnhill, where the Delaware Supreme Court 
in 2019 held that “mission critical” regulatory requirements provide notice, such that the directors are 
on guard to act in an oversight capacity regarding that issue. 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (en banc); 
see Graham, 188 A.2d at 129 (explaining that directors must first be on notice that regulatory compli-
ance is a risk to their business). 
 90 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 129–30 (opting not to address what oversight duties directors will 
have when there are facts showing a cause for suspicion). In 1996, In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery further developed the occasion where a direc-
tor does have an affirmative duty. 698 A.2d at 970. Marchand further defines the scope of a Caremark 
claim by identifying criteria that provides enough notice to trigger directors’ attention to a potential 
source of risk. 212 A.3d at 824 (explaining that critical components of the corporation always provide 
enough notice that triggers oversight obligations). 
 91 See 188 A.2d at 130 (describing what directors do not have a duty to do). 
 92 Id. (explaining that directors do not have to be so “watchful” as to anticipate all misconduct). 
 93 Id. (“[A]bsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a 
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect ex-
ists.”). 
 94 911 A.2d 362, 367–68 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (explaining how the court interpreted Graham in 
In re Caremark); see In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969 (analyzing Graham). 
 95 Stone, 911 A.2d at 367–68. 
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esty unless they have reason to suspect the reporting system’s integrity.96 This 
interpretation acts as an outer limit to the directors’ oversight responsibilities 
because it leaves open the possibility that the directors still have an obligation 
to establish a reporting system, but they do not have to be wary of their em-
ployees’ integrity without cause.97 Ultimately, the court chose the broader in-
terpretation, which allowed the Chancery Court in In re Caremark to hold that 
directors have a duty to maintain an oversight system.98 
2. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation Established a 
Nearly Impossible Standard That Created an Overlap Between the Duty 
of Good Faith & the Duty of Oversight 
In 1996, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery noted that although directors do not have to go so 
extreme as to have a “system of espionage,” the board is responsible for some 
level of oversight.99 Like the plaintiffs in Graham, the plaintiffs in Caremark 
alleged that the directors should have known about employees violating federal 
law.100 The plaintiffs argued that the directors violated a duty to monitor corpo-
rate function and therefore exposed the company to legal liability.101 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Id. In In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained why the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Graham was too narrow. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969; see also Graham, 
188 A.2d at 130 (emphasizing the need for suspicion before an oversight duty arises). The court pro-
vided three reasons for rejecting this interpretation of Graham. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970; see 
also Graham, 188 A.2d at 130; First, the court emphasized the corporate board’s importance in corpo-
rate law. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. Then, the court emphasized the need for pertinent and 
prompt information for the board to fulfill its management responsibilities under section 141(a) of the 
Delaware Code, which entitles directors to manage the corporation’s affairs. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(a) (West 2020); In re Caremark, 698 A.3d at 970. Finally, the court observed the importance of 
reduced sentencing for companies when the organization makes a good faith effort to meet govern-
ance responsibilities. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. The court offered both explanations and then 
ultimately chose a broader approach. Id. at 969. 
 97 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 368 (viewing the decision in In re Caremark as an acknowledgement 
that directors are not subject to liability for assuming employees’ honesty, but noting they still have a 
duty to establish a monitoring system). 
 98 See id. (explaining the duty of oversight within a Caremark claim); see also In re Caremark, 
698 A.2d at 970.  
 99 698 A.2d at 969–70; see Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 (analyzing In re Caremark to compare the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s narrow interpretation of Graham to the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
broad interpretation). 
 100 Compare Graham, 188 A.2d at 129 (describing the plaintiffs’ assertion that directors have a 
duty to actively oversee the corporation, such that they should have known about the employees vio-
lating antitrust laws), with In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (describing the complaint’s allegations of 
the directors’ breach of their duty of oversight for unawareness of illegal referral payments). The 
Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Caremark considered the proposed settlement of the derivative 
action to determine whether it was fair and reasonable. 698 A.2d at 960, 966 (describing the settle-
ment terms, such as the settlement to include the company’s assertion that employees will not conduct 
illegal referrals, board review of relevant regulations, and the creation of a committee dealing with 
ethics and compliance). The derivative action arose after employees allegedly violated federal law and 
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The court considered whether the board had an affirmative responsibility 
to oversee the corporation to ensure it operated lawfully.102 The court explained 
that interpreting Graham to limit directors’ duty to when they have a reason for 
suspicion would be inconsistent with Delaware corporate law’s policy inter-
ests.103 Recalling directors’ responsibility to be reasonably informed in accord-
ance with the duty of care, the court explained that the board must establish 
reporting mechanisms for the corporation.104 The court acknowledged that it is 
up to the board to exercise its business judgment in determining the extent of 
information directors must obtain to satisfy their oversight obligations.105 This 
duty required directors to make a good faith attempt to implement a monitor-
ing system for the corporation.106 Moreover, the court determined that the di-
rectors’ duty continues beyond implementation because directors must monitor 
the adequacy of the established reporting process.107 Ultimately, the duty estab-
lished by the court in In re Caremark provided future plaintiffs with an addi-
tional avenue to hold directors liable for a corporation’s losses.108 
                                                                                                                           
regulations concerning health care providers. Id. The Anti-Referral Payments Law governed Care-
mark’s relationship with Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement programs. Id. at 961–62; see 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)–(b) (criminalizing giving false material information to a federal health pro-
gram); Id. § 1395nn (restricting referrals from physicians in specific circumstances, such as where the 
entity benefitting from the referral compensates the referring physician); see also A Roadmap for New 
Physicians: Fraud & Abuse Laws, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.: U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp [https://perma.cc/yZ9U-CDVY] (de-
scribing fraud and abuse laws governing kickbacks for referrals, such as the illegality of submitting 
false claims or paying for referrals). As a result of the alleged violations, the plaintiffs brought a de-
rivative action arguing that the Caremark board violated its duty to oversee the corporation, which 
exposed the company to liability. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.  
 101 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (noting that the plaintiffs’ theory was one of the most diffi-
cult claims to advance because it fell outside the duties of care and loyalty). 
 102 Id. Five derivative actions comprised the consolidated action in In re Caremark. 698 A.2d at 
964. Originally, the complaint alleged that the board’s failure to monitor the employees’ conduct and 
implement remedial measures constituted a violation of their duty of care. Id. The complaint evolved 
through several amendments. Id. (adding additional allegations regarding indictments and the signifi-
cant cost of legal fees incurred by Caremark). The defendants, Caremark’s board of directors, sought 
to dismiss each iteration of the complaint for failing to show demand futility and stating an inadequate 
claim because the company’s certificate of incorporation exculpated directors’ liability for care 
claims. Id. at 964–65. 
 103 Id. at 969–70. 
 104 Id. at 970. 
 105 Compare Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 (explaining that directors do not have to “operate a corpo-
rate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing” without suspicion prompting them), with In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (holding that directors have an obligation to make a good faith attempt to 
establish a reporting mechanism to ensure that they are informed of employee conduct). 
 106 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. (explaining that a failure to meet the oversight obligations described in In re Caremark 
may “in theory” result in director liability); see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (en 
banc) (attempting to use the oversight liability established in In re Caremark to hold directors liable). 
In In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery evaluated the proposed settlement’s fairness and 
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The Delaware Supreme Court in Stone acknowledged that acting in good 
faith is an integral part of fulfilling the oversight duty established in In re 
Caremark.109 The characterization of a Caremark claim as a breach of good 
faith and a condition for asserting a loyalty claim highlighted the analytical 
gymnastics the court used to convert a care claim into a non-exculpable loyalty 
claim.110 The duty of good faith invoked both a duty of care and a duty of loy-
alty analysis.111 The cases below seek to clarify this entanglement by showing 
how bad faith conduct relates to the duty of care and how establishing a viola-
tion of good faith invokes a breach of the duty of loyalty.112 
3. Defining Bad Faith Conduct Via the Duty of Care 
In 2006, in In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware 
Supreme Court relied on the duty of care to describe how to identify conduct 
not exercised in good faith.113 The plaintiffs had alleged that the board had vio-
lated the duties of care and good faith by approving both the original employ-
ment agreement, which hired Michael Ovitz as president, and the subsequent 
severance package valued at approximately $130 million.114 The court held 
that a failure to act in good faith is conduct beyond a duty of care violation.115 
The court differentiated bad faith conduct from care violations protected by ex-
culpation provisions by establishing that conduct not made in good faith is more 
blameworthy than a duty of care violation because it requires some level of in-
tent.116 This analysis supports that some conduct even if arising from a duty of 
care analysis, can be so egregious as to render it a violation of the directors’ fi-
                                                                                                                           
reasonableness. 698 A.2d at 959. After articulating directors’ oversight obligations, the court noted 
that the settlement appeared adequate because the record did not have enough evidence to support the 
plaintiffs’ oversight claims. Id. at 970–71. The court explained that the existence of a corporate com-
pliance committee within Caremark made the motion to dismiss likely to succeed. Id. 
 109 Stone, 911 A.2d at 368. 
 110 See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 62 (explaining how the duty of good faith applies when direc-
tors substantially disregard their duties); Sale, supra note 57, at 720 (exploring the role of good faith 
in In re Caremark). Although Stone expressly designates the good faith component of a Caremark 
claim as a condition for a duty of loyalty violation, Marchand and In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriva-
tive Litigation soften this language. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019) (en 
banc) (describing the duty of oversight as requiring a good faith effort); Stone, 911 A.2d at 368 
(same); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (same). 
 111 Griffith, supra note 32, at 3. 
 112 See infra notes 113–126 and accompanying text. 
 113 In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006); see su-
pra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 114 Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67; see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 115 See Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67 (describing misconduct outside of self-dealing and being unin-
formed as acting not in good faith). 
 116 Id.; see supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the Delaware Supreme 
Court 2006 case In re the Walt Disney Co.). 
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duciary responsibility to stockholders and thus the director should face liabil-
ity.117 The duty to act in good faith is the vehicle to capture such liability.118 
4. Bad Faith as a Condition for Oversight Liability 
The example set in In re the Walt Disney Co., where a director knowingly 
ignores their duties, most closely aligns with the test for a violation of the duty 
of oversight articulated in In re Caremark.119 Failing to implement any report-
ing mechanism constitutes a knowing disregard of the directors’ required over-
sight responsibility—especially when choosing to disregard warning signs of 
non-compliance.120 In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with 
the classification of this conduct as an omission made in bad faith and reiterat-
ed that such a violation of the duty of good faith operates as a required element 
for oversight liability.121 
The framework described in Stone restructured the dynamic of the duty of 
good faith by interpreting it as an element of the duty of loyalty rather than a 
different basis of liability altogether.122 The court used the duty of good faith to 
construe a violation of the duty of oversight as a violation of the duty of loyal-
ty.123 If violating good faith is necessary to show a breach of the duty of over-
sight and that violation of good faith still serves as a subsidiary element of 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Disney II, 906 A.2d at 66 (describing bad faith as “more culpable,” suggesting that bad 
faith conduct is worse than a duty of care violation); Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 20 (describing the 
baseline definition of good faith); Nowicki, supra note 59, at 454 (explaining common understandings 
of good faith to include “honesty, lack of ill-intentions, fairness, full disclosure, and sincere attempts 
to honor an obligation”). 
 118 Disney II, 906 A.2d at 66. 
 119 See id. at 67 (describing bad faith conduct); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 
A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that directors are required to make a “a good faith at-
tempt” to establish reporting mechanisms to ensure they are informed). 
 120 See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (interpreting the emphasis on suspicion in Graham as 
only one aspect of directors’ oversight responsibility); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 
(Del. 2006) (en banc) (defining “red flags” as facts demonstrating the board’s awareness of inadequate 
internal monitoring mechanisms (quoting Stone v. Ritter, C.A. No. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *2 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006), aff’d, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.)); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 
125, 129 (Del. 1963) (concluding there was no evidence to support the inference that directors knew 
of the employees’ illegal activities, but noting two reports from the Federal Trade Commission that 
employees had taken part in illegal antitrust activity previously); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Deriva-
tive Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111, 115 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the general 
health of the financial market as a warning sign was conclusory and an attempt to attach liability to 
directors for a decision that resulted poorly in hindsight). 
 121 911 A.3d at 369. 
 122 Compare Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67 (describing a violation of the duty to act in good faith as 
fundamentally different from the duties of care and loyalty), with Stone, 911 A.3d at 369 (noting that 
the duty of good faith is an element capable of proving a breach of the duty of loyalty because “a 
failure to act in good faith requires conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable 
than, the conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care”). 
 123 Stone, 911 A.3d at 369. 
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proving a breach of the duty of loyalty, then establishing oversight liability is a 
manifestation of conduct violating the duty of loyalty.124 
The court’s analysis in Stone illustrated that the Caremark claim is anoth-
er avenue of proving a breach of the duty of loyalty without needing to show 
self-dealing.125 Although this framework set the legal foundation for using 
good faith as a vehicle to transform otherwise exculpable conduct as a care 
violation into a non-exculpable loyalty violation, Caremark claims consistently 
failed until Marchand v. Barnhill.126 
II. MARCHAND V. BARNHILL SHARPENED THE REALITY OF  
OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES 
On June 20, 2019, in Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that Blue Bell’s directors breached a fiduciary duty by failing to fulfill 
their oversight responsibilities.127 In 2015, Blue Bell’s failure to contain the 
Listeria outbreak in its plants led to Listeria’s presence in products available to 
the public.128 Blue Bell recalled all products, closed production, and laid off 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Id. 
 125 Id.; Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 72. 
 126 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing 
a claim for a breach of the duty of oversight as one of the most difficult claims that a plaintiff can 
allege); QUINN, supra note 31 at 411 (noting how difficult it is to claim a breach of the duty of over-
sight under a Caremark claim); see also Claudia A. Restrepo, Note, The Need for Increased Possibil-
ity of Director Liability: Refusal to Dismiss In re Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Derivative Litiga-
tion, a Step in the Right Direction, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1689, 1693–94 (2019). 
 127 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (holding that the plaintiff pled enough facts to sup-
port an inference that the board failed to establish a reasonable oversight system to manage the “most 
central consumer safety and legal compliance issue facing the company”). In 2019, in Marchand v. 
Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that the plaintiff, Jack L. Marchand II, was a stock-
holder suing defendant, John W. Barnhill, a director of Blue Bell, and other directors. Complaint at 4–
5, Marchand, 212 A.3d 805 (No. 2017-0586). Blue Bell, a Delaware corporation, was the nominal 
defendant. Id. As nominal defendant, Blue Bell was a party to the suit because of its connection to the 
lawsuit, despite its lack of responsibility in the suit. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807 (identifying Blue Bell 
and directors as defendants); see Nominal Party, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/nominal_party [https://perma.cc/VX6F-XFUS]. This Note focuses on the com-
plaint’s allegation that the company’s directors breached the duty of oversight as established in In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807 (describing the Care-
mark claim duty as a “duty of loyalty”). The complaint also alleged that Paul Kruse, the president and 
CEO, and Greg Bridges, a vice president, violated their duties of care and loyalty. Id. All the defend-
ants sought to dismiss the complaint for insufficiently pleading demand futility, which required the 
plaintiff to show that most of the board could not consider the demand to sue Kruse and Bridges with-
out bias. Id. at 807–08. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted the dismissal of the claims against 
Kruse and Bridges, holding that the plaintiff needed to show one more director’s bias to plead demand 
futility. Id. at 808. The Chancery Court also dismissed the Caremark claim, holding that the plaintiff 
sought to challenge the effectiveness of the oversight controls instead of meeting the Caremark stand-
ard. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court’s holdings. Id. 
 128 Id. at 807; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing what the Listeria outbreak 
entailed). 
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employees.129 Tragically, three people died from the Listeria present in the 
company’s products.130 
The costs of the recall and the manufacturing shutdown ultimately created 
liquidity problems, which required a private equity investment that diluted 
stockholders’ share value and resulted in derivative litigation.131 The Delaware 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a 
reasonable inference that Blue Bell’s board did not administer any monitoring 
system for the corporation’s compliance with food safety regulations, reversing 
the Chancery Court’s holding.132 This holding was the first instance in which 
the court did not dismiss the breach of a duty of oversight claim.133 
Signs of a potential food safety crisis began in 2009 when the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), Alabama Department of Health, and internal 
inspections conducted by Blue Bell reported several sources of contamination 
to management.134 Then, in 2013 and 2014, Blue Bell’s plant received positive 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807 (noting that Blue Bell laid off a third of its employees); Dan 
Flynn, Blue Bell Reports on Root Causes of Five-Year Listeria Outbreak, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 
27, 2016), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/03/blue-bell-reports-on-root-causes-of-five-year-
listeria-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/EV2W-SK6L] (describing the Blue Bell product recall and produc-
tion shutdown). 
 130 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807; Elahe Izadi, Three Dead in Listeria Outbreak Linked to Blue Bell 
Ice Cream, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/
2015/03/13/three-dead-in-listeria-outbreak-linked-to-blue-bell-ice-cream/ [https://perma.cc/K88G-
7WAW]. 
 131 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 807; Spivey et al., supra note 3. 
 132 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809; see also In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 
2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (emphasizing the influence of Marchand 
when regulations govern a company’s central operations). 
 133 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809. 
 134 Id. at 811. In July 2009, a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspection of Blue 
Bell’s Texas facility uncovered condensation from pipes dripping into ice cream cartons and reported 
it to Kruse. Id. The FDA visited the Texas facility again in May 2010 and observed ten violations, 
including the same condensation drip. Id. Also, in March 2010, the Alabama Department of Health 
found improperly placed equipment and a damaged ceiling in the Alabama facility. Id. Another in-
spection in Alabama in July 2011 found additional health risks in the same location. Id. Finally, an 
inspection of the Oklahoma facility discovered inadequate controls against contamination. Id. Alt-
hough this Note does not explore why the FDA did not intervene earlier to prevent the outbreak, it is 
noteworthy that the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) had not been implemented at the time of 
the outbreak. Dianna Wray, Blue Bell’s Listeria Problem Is a Sticky Mess, DALL. OBSERVER (July 1, 
2015), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/blue-bells-listeria-problem-is-a-sticky-mess-7359432 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210516151634/https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/blue-bells-
listeria-problem-is-a-sticky-mess-7359432] (observing that Congress passed the FSMA in 2010); see 
also 21 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2206 (entitling this subchapter as “Improving Capacity to Prevent Food Safe-
ty Problems”); Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), FDA, https://www.fda.gov/food/guidance-
regulation-food-and-dietary-supplements/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma [https://perma.cc/8UBZ-
MJEV] (Jan. 4, 2021) (explaining the FSMA’s purpose to emphasize prevention of foodborne illness 
rather than reacting to such illnesses). The FDA introduced the FSMA to address the mostly preventa-
ble public health risk stemming from foodborne diseases, which impacts approximately forty-eight 
million people in the United States per year. Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), supra. 
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tests for Listeria.135 By February 2015, the Listeria problem extended to Blue 
Bell’s products.136 By March 2015, the Listeria infection reached consumers, 
causing illness in five people in Kansas and three in Texas.137 By the end of 
April, there were ten cases of the infection.138 After the complete recall, the 
FDA found significant food safety deficiencies in Blue Bell’s three manufac-
turing plants.139 
Section A of this Part explains the facts the plaintiff relied upon to suffi-
ciently allege that the Blue Bell board breached its duty of oversight.140 Section 
B explores the importance the court in Marchand placed on the monoline na-
ture of Blue Bell’s business and how this analysis informed subsequent court 
decisions regarding Caremark claims, such as the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery’s 2019 decision in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation.141 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 811–12. These tests confirmed Listeria’s presence in Blue Bell’s plant 
in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. Jesse Newman, FDA: Blue Bell Had Evidence of Listeria in March 
2013, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-blue-bell-had-evidence-of-listeria-in-march-
2013-1431028954 [https://perma.cc/WK4J-KG7A] (May 7, 2015). In 2014, a laboratory dedicated to 
analyzing samples from the Oklahoma facility found that the samples tested positive for Listeria. 
Marchand, 212 A.3d at 812. 
 136 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 813. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS: U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS OF BLUE BELL CREAMERIES, L.P. (2015) (explaining 
findings from inspections performed from March 16, 2015 to May 1, 2015 of Blue Bell production 
facilities); Mark Collette, FDA: Blue Bell Knew of Listeria, Didn’t Correct Problems, HOUS. CHRON., 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/FDA-Blue-Bell-didn-t-
correct-problems-after-6249881.php [https://perma.cc/NUC3-EG7Z] (May 7, 2015) (explaining the 
FDA’s inspection reports); Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell Creameries Prod-
ucts (Final Update), CDC (June 10, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/ice-cream-03-
15/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q8MV-YHKH] (detailing the investigation of the outbreak). 
 137 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814; see Listeria (Listeriosis), supra note 2 (explaining listeriosis 
infections). Pregnant women, people over sixty-five years old, and people with diminished immune 
systems are particularly vulnerable to a Listeria infection. Listeria Infection, supra note 2. There are a 
wide range of symptoms, varying from fever, nausea, chills, achiness, and diarrhea to symptoms re-
sulting from the infection spreading to the nervous system, such as a headache, confusion, convul-
sions, a sense of imbalance, and a rigid neck. Id. The symptoms become more serious for the vulnera-
ble groups. See id. (identifying symptoms for pregnant people and those with weaker immune sys-
tems). For example, pregnant women may suffer miscarriages, give birth prematurely, or experience a 
possibly lethal infection after the baby is born. Id. 
 138 Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell Creameries Products (Final Update), 
supra note 136. 
 139 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 814; see Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Blue Bell 
Creameries Products (Final Update), supra note 136 (explaining the various investigations into the 
outbreak’s cause). 
 140 See infra notes 145–155 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 156–190 and accompanying text; see also Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (recog-
nizing the first successfully alleged breach of duty of oversight); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriva-
tive Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (relying on 
Marchand to determine that the plaintiffs successfully stated a breach of duty of oversight claim). 
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A. Marchand v. Barnhill: Facts Supporting a Well-Pled Caremark Claim 
Under a Caremark claim, a plaintiff alleging a breach of the duty of over-
sight has two options to demonstrate a board’s failure to meet its oversight re-
sponsibilities.142 First, a plaintiff can argue that the directors entirely failed to 
implement a monitoring system.143 Second, a plaintiff can assert that the board 
failed to observe an existing oversight system.144 Despite indications of a food 
safety problem, the Blue Bell board of directors remained unaware of the issue 
until after the first limited recall—two years after the first reported evidence of 
Listeria.145 In Marchand, the Delaware Supreme Court held that although Blue 
Bell had an internal sanitation compliance manual, both a failure to implement 
an oversight mechanism and a conscious disregard of warnings about the ensu-
ing food safety problem satisfied Caremark because the claims met both op-
tions identified for plaintiffs to allege a failure to fulfill basic oversight respon-
sibilities.146 
The board’s failure to institute the following oversight mechanisms made 
the directors susceptible to a Caremark claim: (1) a board committee managing 
food safety concerns, (2) a regular procedure requiring management to inform 
the board of food safety operations, (3) a systematic schedule by which the 
board examined food safety risks, and (4) a consistent discussion of food safe-
ty issues in board meeting minutes.147 These factors indicate the importance of 
board involvement in establishing and monitoring an oversight mechanism.148 
An internal compliance manual is not enough when the board is not actively 
overseeing it.149 
Management’s knowledge and subsequent disregard of the food safety 
risks occurring in Blue Bell’s facilities extended to the board due to Paul 
                                                                                                                           
 142 In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (stating that the duty of oversight established in In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation provides two identifiable avenues for plaintiffs to 
plead a breach of the duty); see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (explaining that the board must in good faith implement a monitoring system, but noting it 
does not have to monitor it to the extent that the board must “ferret out wrongdoing”). 
 143 In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13. 
 144 Id. (describing the two options for pleading a Caremark claim). 
 145 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 812. 
 146 See id. at 822 (explaining the facts relevant to the court’s Caremark analysis). In 2018, in 
Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Court of Chancery relied on the existence of a guidance manual 
prescribing procedures for sanitations to find that the board met the Caremark requirements for a 
monitoring system. C.A. No. 2017-0586, 2018 WL 4657159, at *17, *19 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), 
rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this analysis after noting that 
“routine regulatory requirements” are not generally “directed at the board.” Marchand, 212 A.3d at 
823. 
 147 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822. 
 148 Id. at 822–23 (emphasizing that compliance with FDA regulations at some level does not 
fulfill Caremark, which requires board level monitoring); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 
2006) (en banc) (highlighting the board’s role in implementing internal controls). 
 149 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823; QUINN, supra note 31 at 280. 
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Kruse’s position as chairman of the board and Blue Bell’s chief executive of-
ficer (CEO).150 The board’s meeting minutes showed no disclosure of reports, 
despite the fact that Kruse, in his capacity as CEO, had received reports of evi-
dence from the FDA foreshadowing the upcoming Listeria outbreak.151 Kruse’s 
role on the board and in management placed him in the unique position to cor-
rect the gap in the board’s oversight mechanisms because he was aware of the 
risks “intrinsically critical” to Blue Bell’s business but did not disclose them to 
the rest of the board.152 Despite the obvious importance of food safety to Blue 
Bell’s business as a food producer, however, the board did not have evidence 
that it regularly discussed food safety concerns.153 
The combination of these facts provided the court with sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that Blue Bell’s board did not make a good faith effort to 
implement a reasonable monitoring and reporting process for the corporation’s 
“central compliance risks.”154 The critical importance of food safety to a corpo-
ration producing only ice cream, and the lack of a food safety monitoring system 
within Blue Bell, allowed the plaintiff to successfully plead a Caremark claim.155 
B. The Importance of the Industry Context and Inferring Intent 
In Marchand, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized the monoline na-
ture of Blue Bell’s business model to infer the scienter required to breach a 
duty of good faith.156 Blue Bell’s business—the production of food—only has 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 811. In his position as CEO, the FDA reported its results directly to 
Kruse. Id.  
 151 Id. at 811, 822 (noting that the FDA reported its results to Kruse, but noting that management 
had only disclosed favorable food safety information to the board despite the known reports illustrat-
ing the growing risk of contamination). The violations that the FDA reported to Kruse included re-
ports of condensation falling into unfilled cartons, open containers of ingredients, and inadequate 
handwashing. Id. 
 152 See id. at 822 (demonstrating how the monoline nature of Blue Bell informed the Caremark 
oversight expectation). 
 153 Id. The essential nature of food safety was critical to the court’s analysis. See id. at 824 (ar-
ticulating that the bare minimum requirement of a Caremark claim is ensuring that a monitoring sys-
tem is in place to evaluate “central compliance risks” and that the board oversees such a system). If 
the board failed to monitor food safety, then any monitoring system in place was not reasonable. See 
id. (suggesting a reasonable and adequate monitoring system requires oversight of critical compliance 
concerns). 
 154 Id. at 824. 
 155 Id. (noting that “[i]n Blue Bell’s case, food safety was essential and mission critical”). 
 156 See id. at 809 (explaining that Blue Bell’s only product is ice cream, which makes food safety 
a critical compliance concern); Our Products, BLUE BELL CREAMERIES, https://www.bluebell.com/
our-products/ [https://perma.cc/KHB9-J84V] (listing Blue Bell’s products, which all have an ice 
cream base). Monoline describes those companies that focus on one product and become specialized 
in that specific service. Adam Hayes, Monoline, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
m/monoline.asp [https://perma.cc/UBB2-FZHP] (Feb. 10, 2021). In contrast, an example of a business 
that is not monoline is Procter & Gamble, which has a huge number of brands and various types of 
products. Brands, PROCTER & GAMBLE, https://us.pg.com/brands/ [https://perma.cc/UB7G-982E]. 
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one “central compliance” concern, the safety of its food.157 Blue Bell’s success, 
therefore, depended on consumers’ baseline confidence in the product’s safe-
ty.158 Emphasizing food safety as Blue Bell’s primary compliance concern, the 
court expanded upon In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation 
by further defining what the board must do to assure they receive “appropri-
ate” or “adequate” information.159 Where there is a central compliance con-
cern, the board must receive reports on that issue to obtain the information re-
quired under In re Caremark.160 After identifying the essential compliance re-
quirements that Blue Bell’s board must monitor, the Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded that the complete absence of a food safety monitoring system suffi-
ciently alleged a Caremark claim.161 
As a result of food safety’s critical importance to Blue Bell’s business, the 
court could infer that maintaining food safety compliance was a known over-
sight duty for the board.162 The inference that the board knew of its duty al-
lowed the court to concluded that the board did not make a good faith effort to 
uphold its duty.163 Inferring knowledge of the importance of food safety aided 
the court in finding the board’s conscious disregard of its responsibility.164 This 
analysis combined the duty of care with good faith by acknowledging that a 
reasonably prudent director would oversee a compliance issue, particularly 
where only one central compliance issue exists.165 Even though this inference 
of knowledge arguably would meet the difficult gross negligence standard for 
                                                                                                                           
Procter & Gamble’s portfolio ranges from laundry products to hair care, with everything in between. 
Id. 
 157 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Compare id. at 824 (requiring the board to institute a “reasonable system of monitoring and 
reporting about the corporation’s central compliance risks”), with In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (defining the duty of oversight as requiring directors to 
implement an oversight mechanism that reports “appropriate information”). Analyzing these cases 
together, the court in Marchand identified “central compliance risks” as required for a successful 
Caremark claim. Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (emphasizing essential compliance concerns), 
with In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (requiring directors to oversee “appropriate information”).  
 160 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (explaining that directors have a responsibility to monitor 
certain information). 
 161 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824. 
 162 See id. (describing food safety as “mission critical”); see also id. at 822 (explaining that an 
inference that a board did not make any effort to remain informed of compliance concerns “intrinsical-
ly critical” to operations supports a conclusion that the board did not try in good faith pursuant to 
Caremark). 
 163 Id. at 824; see supra notes 56–76 and accompanying texts (describing intentionality and the 
moral aspects of good faith). 
 164 Id. at 824; see supra notes 56–76 and accompanying texts (explaining the relationship between 
intentionality and good faith). 
 165 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (explaining that the plaintiff met the pleading burden after 
relying on records from board meetings to support a fair inference that directors failed to implement a 
system to ascertain Blue Bell’s compliance with the most obvious safety issue for the company—food 
safety). 
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duty of care claims, the exculpation provisions prevent monetary liability for 
duty of care violations.166 Thus, the court turned its focus to the board’s lack of 
good faith.167 
The court’s acknowledgment that In re Caremark required the board to 
exert a good faith effort to act in accordance with the duty of care importantly 
reclaimed the duty of care as a means for establishing liability.168 Although the 
court could not attach liability for the failure to exercise due care, the failure to 
try to exercise care in good faith allowed the care claim to convert into a loyal-
ty claim.169 The court relied on the fact that Blue Bell made only one prod-
uct—ice cream—and consequently had only one essential compliance con-
cern—food safety—to marry the duty of care and the duty of loyalty to create 
a non-exculpable duty of oversight.170 The good faith requirement made this 
marriage possible; without using the monoline business model to infer 
knowledge, the care claim could not transform into a successful Caremark 
claim.171 
Shortly after Marchand, in October 2019, in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery emphasized the im-
portance of a company’s monoline services when it denied the corporation’s 
motion to dismiss a complaint alleging that the directors violated their over-
sight responsibilities.172 The derivative cause of action in In re Clovis alleged 
that the directors breached their fiduciary obligations by failing to oversee the 
                                                                                                                           
 166 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2020); see Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809, 824 (con-
cluding that the directors “consciously failed” their duty of oversight). In Marchand, the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s attribution of consciousness to the directors’ breach of a fiduciary duty reflects the 
conscious omission in the definition of gross negligence. Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (de-
termining that the directors consciously disregarded their oversight duties, which could theoretically 
meet the high bar of gross negligence for breach of care claims except for the elimination of damages 
resulting from an exculpation provision), with Gross Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 38 (describing gross negligence as a “conscious . . . omission”), and supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text (defining gross negligence). 
 167 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824. 
 168 See id. (explaining that at a minimum, In re Caremark must require corporate directors to 
fulfill their duty of care with a good faith effort, otherwise the directors would violate their duty of 
loyalty). 
 169 See id. 
 170 See id. at 809, 813 (identifying food safety as Blue Bell’s critical compliance issue and de-
scribing directors’ lack of care to monitor it). The Delaware court highlighted that Blue Bell did not 
have three key components of an appropriate oversight mechanism: (1) a committee responsible for 
monitoring food, (2) a regular portion of board meetings dedicated to food safety, and (3) a procedure 
requiring compliance reports’ presentation to the board. Id. at 813. These failures have a shared quali-
ty with care claims: the board’s failure to inform itself. See id.; supra note 37 and accompanying text 
(noting the importance of acting on an informed basis when fulfilling the duty of care). 
 171 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (relying on Blue Bell’s monoline business structure to infer 
directors’ consciousness of their disregard of a duty). 
 172 In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (explaining that the duty of oversight is critical, “especially so when a mono-
line company operates in a high regulated industry”). 
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clinical trial for the primary drug in development at Clovis Oncology, Inc. 
(Clovis).173 The court concluded that the plaintiffs, stockholders of Clovis, suf-
ficiently pled facts showing that the directors were substantially likely to face 
liability for a breach of their oversight obligations.174 Like Blue Bell’s business 
in Marchand, Clovis’s business as a pharmaceutical company was monoline, 
and, as a result, the court emphasized that the central compliance concern for 
the company would be drug safety.175 The plaintiff demonstrated that 
Rociletinib (Roci), the drug at the clinical trial stage, was essential to the cor-
poration’s success.176 Using the analysis articulated in Marchand, the court in 
In re Clovis inferred that the board knew the oversight responsibilities associ-
ated with drug safety, particularly in the context of a clinical trial, and con-
sciously disregarded them.177 This disregard of a known duty constituted a 
breach of the duty of good faith, allowing the court to transform a care claim 
into a breach of loyalty under Caremark.178 
Unlike Blue Bell, which did not have a committee dedicated to food safe-
ty, Clovis had two subcommittees dedicated to compliance issues.179 Although 
the court in Marchand relied on the absence of an oversight committee as evi-
dence of Blue Bell’s breach of its oversight duties, the court in In re Clovis 
noted that the defendants on the committees affirmatively knew the FDA 
standards required for drug approval and disregarded them.180 When the board 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Id. In 2019, in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery noted that Clovis Oncology, Inc. (Clovis) had only one drug in development that showed prom-
ise—Rociletinib (Roci). Id. Roci is a treatment for lung cancer. Id. 
 174 Id. According to the Delaware Supreme Court 1993 case Rales v. Blasband, when directors 
face a substantial likelihood of liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty, plaintiffs can successfully 
allege the futility of making demand on the board and thus can defeat the business judgment presump-
tion. 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (describing that a majority of directors must face a substantial 
likelihood of liability for the court to deem them interested, such that the plaintiff’s demand is futile); 
see supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the Rales standard). 
 175 In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1. 
 176 Id. (finding that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that Roci was critical to Clovis’s operation). 
 177 See id. (citing Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809, 822 (Del. 2019) (en banc)) (noting 
Clovis’s dependence on Roci’s success, and then describing the board’s ignorance of warning signs as 
support for a well-pled Caremark claim). 
 178 Id. at *7 (describing the board’s failure to respond to warning signs as placing “hands on their 
ears to muffle the alarms” about the compliance failure). 
 179 Id. at *2 (highlighting the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and the Audit 
Committee as relevant to Clovis’s oversight system). The Nominating and Corporate Governance 
Committee’s responsibility was to advance and monitor Clovis’s compliance with regulatory require-
ments. Id. The Audit Committee reviewed Clovis’s earnings reports before releasing them to the pub-
lic. Id. 
 180 Id. at *5 (“Indeed, each of the Board Defendants appreciated the FDA ‘could only make its 
decision . . . to approve Roci based on [] confirmed responses.’” (alternation in original) (quoting 
Supplemental Consolidated Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint ¶¶ 99–100, id. (No. 2017-
0222)). Despite the FDA requirements, Clovis calculated Roci’s success rate based partially on uncon-
firmed responses. Id. at *6. Confirmed responses require tumor shrinkage to not show in the first scan 
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learned that the clinical trial reported unconfirmed responses in defiance of the 
regulatory requirements, the board did nothing to correct the process.181 In 
light of these facts, the court in In re Clovis held that the board disregarded 
warning signs that Clovis violated the clinical trial protocol, and denied the 
board’s motion to dismiss.182 
The opinions in Marchand and In re Clovis clarified that boards have 
more onerous oversight responsibilities when the corporations they manage 
operate in an industry with regulatory requirements for their essential business 
operations.183 This emphasis enhanced the In re Caremark standard for alleg-
ing the breach of the duty of oversight because directors managing a corpora-
tion with a monoline business model have a heightened oversight obligation.184 
The courts even differentiated the traditional In re Caremark standard from the 
standard applied in the monoline context, noting that even in a monoline indus-
try, a Caremark claim does not require omniscience.185 By acknowledging that 
In re Caremark imposes different requirements for monoline corporations, the 
court expressed a willingness to make Caremark claims more feasible for plain-
tiffs, at least in circumstances similar to that of Marchand and In re Clovis.186 
In Marchand and In re Clovis, the courts considered two new factors 
when evaluating Caremark claims: (1) whether the corporation was monoline 
and (2) whether the corporation’s primary industry was heavily regulated.187 
These two factors led the court to deny the motions to dismiss, opening the 
door to the possibility of Blue Bell and Clovis directors facing liability for 
                                                                                                                           
after treatment and in a subsequent scan. Id. at *5 n.68. Unconfirmed responses, in contrast, do not 
require a second scan. Id. 
 181 Id. at *6. 
 182 Id. at *11 (denying the motion to dismiss because the complaint successfully alleged facts that 
Clovis’s board ignored warning signs that Clovis violated the clinical study requirements); see infra 
note 202 and accompanying text (explaining the Response Evaluation Criteria in Solid Tumors (RE-
CIST) protocol). 
 183 Id. at *13 (remarking that the Marchand decision requires the board to “rigorously exercise[]” 
its oversight responsibility when external regulatory requirements govern the company’s essential 
operations). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (concluding that the plain-
tiff successfully pled a Caremark claim because of Blue Bell’s monoline structure); see also In re 
Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *10 (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the court could 
infer that the directors knowingly breached their oversight duties due to the clear importance of Clo-
vis’s adherence to the clinical trial protocols set out by the FDA). 
 187 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 810, 824 (relying on Blue Bell’s monoline business and the signif-
icance of complying with FDA regulations as factors in finding a well-pled Caremark claim); In re 
Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (explaining the importance of the directors’ duty of oversight as 
“especially so when a monoline company operates in a highly regulated industry”). 
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their failure to oversee their respective corporations.188 Whether courts will 
continue to look for circumstances in which directors should have enhanced 
oversight responsibilities remains an open question.189 The court’s treatment of 
the plaintiffs’ allegations in In re the Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation will 
shed light on the upper and lower boundaries of the Marchand factors when a 
different regulator governs a more multifaceted corporation.190 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF MARCHAND V. BARNHILL 
THROUGH IN RE THE BOEING CO. DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
In 2019, in Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court explained 
that Blue Bell made only one product and had one primary regulator, the 
FDA.191 In 2019, in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Del-
aware Court of Chancery noted that Clovis produced multiple drugs, of which 
only one showed promise, and also faced the FDA as its primary regulator.192 
Part A of this Section explores the differences between the companies at issue 
in Marchand and In re Clovis to highlight the boundaries of the monoline and 
heavily regulated factors that courts consider when plaintiffs bring a Caremark 
claim.193 Part B considers the plaintiffs’ allegations in In re the Boeing Co. De-
rivative Litigation as a case study for the application of Marchand and ulti-
                                                                                                                           
 188 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 820 (acknowledging the difficulty in pleading Caremark claims, and 
reversing the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim); In re Clovis, 2019 WL 
4850188, at *10 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the Caremark claim). 
 189 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (noting that commentators wished the duty of oversight re-
quired more from directors). The significant challenges that plaintiffs historically have faced when 
alleging Caremark claims suggests that another expansion of oversight responsibility will not arrive 
soon. Haugh, supra note 6, at 613 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (en banc)) 
(noting in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court first explicitly “endorsed” the Caremark claim 
and recognized it as one of the most difficult claims available to plaintiffs); Mitchell, supra note 6, at 
248–49 (describing the difficulty of succeeding on a Caremark claim, and then attributing it to Dela-
ware courts’ concern with “distort[ing] the risk/reward calculus of corporate directors leading to a 
dearth of qualified candidates willing to serve”). 
 190 See generally Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 9 (alleging that 
the board of directors at Boeing failed to diligently oversee the corporation, thus creating a Caremark 
claim). Notably, the court is only bound by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Marchand, not 
the Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Clovis. See Vertical Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 38 (explaining that lower courts must follow decisions of higher courts in the same 
jurisdiction). Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 805 (noting that the plaintiff appealed to the Delaware 
Supreme Court), with In re Clovis, 2019 WL 480188, at *1 (confining the decision to narrow facts). 
 191 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809; see also Inter-mktg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. 2017-
0030, 2020 WL 756965, at *11, *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (relying upon the emphasis placed on 
food safety in Marchand as Blue Bell’s central compliance concern to find that the defendants faced a 
substantial likelihood of liability for violating their duty of oversight); In re LendingClub Corp. De-
rivative Litig., C.A. No. 12984, 2019 WL 5678578, at *9 n.59 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2019) (summarizing 
Marchand, but finding it inapplicable to the plaintiffs claim against directors for violating their over-
sight duty because the defendants had an oversight mechanism in place). 
 192 2019 WL 4850188, at *1. 
 193 See infra notes 197–207 and accompanying text. 
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mately determines that the plaintiffs’ claim should survive a motion to dis-
miss.194 Moreover, the analysis seeks to further parse the boundaries of the 
monoline and heavily regulated factors when courts consider a Caremark 
claim.195 Finally, Part C identifies when a Caremark claim will fall within the 
boundaries of the monoline and heavily regulated factors of Marchand and that 
claim is more likely to survive a motion to dismiss.196 
A. The Boundaries of Marchand v. Barnhill 
At the very least, Marchand indicated that when a company produces one 
product governed by one regulator, the compliance concerns imposed by that 
regulator are mission critical, such that the board must at a minimum ensure it 
monitors that one compliance issue.197 When the board failed to ensure that the 
product met the regulator’s requirements, the board breached its duty of over-
sight.198 Where a company produces more than one product, the application of 
the Marchand decision is less clear.199 The In re Clovis decision demonstrated 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See infra notes 208–264 and accompanying text. 
 195 See infra notes 208–264 and accompanying text. 
 196 See infra notes 265–274 and accompanying text. 
 197 See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809, 810, 811, 822, 824 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (ex-
plaining that the board’s failure to attend to the critical compliance concern identified by the FDA 
allows for the inference that directors did not make a good faith effort to fulfill their duty of over-
sight). In 2019, in Marchand v. Barnhill, the food safety regulations imposed by the FDA allowed the 
Delaware Supreme Court to infer that the board knew of its duty to oversee food safety concerns. See 
id. at 810 (describing the FDA’s role in relation to Blue Bell’s business). Blue Bell’s production of 
only one product made the board’s requisite attention to the FDA compliance measures “obvious,” 
enhancing the court’s inference that the directors knew of their responsibility to oversee food safety. 
See id. at 810–11 (explaining how Blue Bell’s monoline structure made food safety of noticeable 
importance). 
 198 Id. at 822; see also Inter-mktg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. 2017-0030, 2020 WL 
756965, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (identifying “pipeline integrity and maintenance” as an essen-
tial compliance concern for Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. (Plains), which is a dominant pipeline 
operator in North America). In 2020, in Inter-marketing Group USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery explained that the plaintiff alleged that the directors of Plains violated their over-
sight duty by knowingly failing to monitor an essential compliance concern, the soundness of the 
pipelines. 2020 WL 756965, at *15. Plains was a partnership that “own[ed” thousands of miles of 
pipelines.” Id. at *1. Consequently, the duty of good faith was contractual in nature rather than based 
on fiduciary responsibilities. Id. at *4. The court relied on Marchand, treating the contractual duty as 
if it were based in fiduciary principles. Id. at *15; see also Marchand, 212 A.3d at 816, 822 (providing 
a basis for the court in Inter-marketing Group). 
 199 Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 810 (reversing the dismissal of the complaint because after 
establishing food safety as intrinsically important, the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to allow for the 
inference that the board failed to adequately observe any oversight or reporting system for food safety 
issues), with Inter-mktg. Grp., 2020 WL 756965, at *11 (establishing pipeline structure as essential for 
Plains’s operations), and In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 
4850188, at *1 (Del Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (treating Clovis as a monoline company because Roci showed 
such promise that it was essential to Clovis’s function). The court in Inter-marketing Group identified 
pipeline structure as mission critical for Plains even though the corporation offered services beyond 
transportation via pipelines. 2020 WL 756965, at *11; see also What We Do, PLAINS ALL AM., https://
1956 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1925 
that a corporation does not have to only produce one product for Marchand to 
apply.200 Although Clovis had multiple drugs in production, Roci showed the 
most promise and was the subject of a clinical trial.201 Clovis’s dependence on 
Roci as the only promising drug in its pipeline made compliance with the FDA 
during the clinical trial mission critical.202 In both Marchand and In re Clovis, 
the board attended to only one vital compliance concern.203 
The court’s determination that a company is monoline and heavily regulat-
ed informs what compliance concerns are mission critical for the board to over-
see.204 When the Marchand factors lead the court to conclude that more than one 
mission critical compliance concern exists, the court is not likely to impose the 
                                                                                                                           
www.plainsallamerican.com/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/44FF-KC4W] (explaining that its business 
organization is comprised of three segments, including “[t]ransportation, [f]acilities, [and] [s]upply 
and [l]ogistics”). 
 200 In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1, *2 (describing Roci as one drug among Clovis’s prod-
ucts). But see Marchand, 212 A.3d at 810 (emphasizing that Blue Bell made only one product). In 
August 2020, the Delaware Court of Chancery reiterated that Marchand could apply to more “com-
plex” corporations in Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan v. Chou. C.A. No. 
2019-0816, 2020 WL 5028065, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020). In Teamsters Local 443 Health Ser-
vices & Insurance Plan, the complexity stemmed from the company’s structure, including manufac-
turing, distribution, and packaging of drugs. Id. There, the court denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss despite the defendants’ increased complexity compared to Blue Bell and Clovis. Id. The court 
determined that the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants’ adherence to FDA regulations was the 
corporation’s primary regulatory concern was sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss. Id. 
 201 In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *2. 
 202 Id. at *1, *4–5 (describing Roci’s success as contingent upon FDA approval, and noting that 
the directors were aware of the FDA’s requirement that confirmed responses, not unconfirmed re-
sponses, should form the results presented to the FDA for approval consideration). The clinical trial 
for Roci utilized the RECIST protocol. Id. at *4 & n.63; see also CTR. FOR INT’L BLOOD & MARROW 
TRANSPLANT RSCH., RETIRED FORMS MANUAL: RESPONSE EVALUATION CRITERIA IN SOLID TU-
MORS (RECIST) app. n (2009), https://www.cibmtr.org/DataManagement/TrainingReference/Manuals/
DataManagement/Documents/appendix-n.pdf [https://perma.cc/26HB-RPS2] (describing criteria to 
measure the confirmation of a response). Confirming responses requires the performance of multiple 
assessments to help avoid overestimation of observed response rates. See generally NAT’L CANCER 
INST., CANCER THERAPY EVALUATION PROGRAM, RESPONSE EVALUATION CRITERIA IN SOLID TU-
MORS (RECIST) QUICK REFERENCE, http://ctep.cancer.gov/protocolDevelopment/docs/quickrcst.doc 
[https://perma.cc/6S6Q-259T]. 
 203 Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822, 824 (considering only food safety as “intrinsically criti-
cal” to Blue Bell’s business as an ice cream producer), with In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *14 
(explaining that the clinical trial for Roci and its applicable regulations were an essential compliance 
concern for Clovis even as the company had other compliance concerns). The Delaware Court of 
Chancery emphasized the importance of a singular compliance concern in Teamsters Local 443 
Health Services & Insurance Plan, even where the corporation might have other lines of business. See 
2020 WL 5028065, at *18 (explaining how a dominant compliance concern can be sufficient even in a 
more complex corporation). 
 204 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809, 810 (highlighting Blue Bell’s monoline structure and the FDA’s 
extensive regulatory requirements); In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (emphasizing that the di-
rectors’ duty to institute a monitoring system is particularly important in the context of a “monoline 
company operat[ing] in a highly regulated industry”). 
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1957 
more onerous oversight burden articulated in Marchand.205 There, the existence 
of a singular mission critical compliance concern allowed the Delaware Supreme 
Court to deem the oversight responsibility so obvious that the board knew of its 
duty to monitor it.206 Consequently, where more than one mission critical com-
pliance concern exists, a knowledge inference becomes more attenuated.207 
B. The In re the Boeing Co. Case Study 
The stockholder derivative complaint, filed in Delaware in February 
2021, In re the Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation alleged that Boeing’s board of 
directors (1) consciously failed to adequately oversee the 737 MAX airplane 
development and (2) failed to adjust their oversight activity after the first 737 
MAX crash.208 The 737 MAX design uses engines placed higher and closer to 
the front of the plane, which is in contrast with older engine iterations that 
have engines further to the back of the aircraft.209 This repositioning resulted in 
a risk of engine stall, which Boeing attempted to remedy with the development 
of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).210 Boeing 
                                                                                                                           
 205 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. 1996) (highlighting that 
claims for a breach of the duty of oversight are potentially the hardest claims for a plaintiff to win in 
corporate law); South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 25 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Caremark claims are difficult to 
plead and harder to prove.”); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. 
Ch. 2009) (describing Caremark claims as difficult, and noting that the requirements to demonstrate 
bad faith are even more difficult than establishing gross negligence). 
 206 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821 (explaining that when the plaintiffs show that the board failed 
to monitor a mission critical concern, the court can infer that the board did not make a good faith 
effort to implement a monitoring system). 
 207 See id. 821–22 (noting the deference afforded to boards under a Caremark claim because 
plaintiffs failed to plead bad faith, but finding that the facts supported the inference that the board did 
not monitor an essential compliance issue, which allowed for the inference that the board made no 
good faith effort to implement a monitoring system). 
 208 See generally Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 3–5 (providing 
facts alleging that the board abandoned its oversight responsibilities). There are minimal redactions in 
the consolidated complaint, which the plaintiffs filed in 2021, two years after the plaintiffs filed origi-
nal complaints separately. Letter to Counsel at 5, In re the Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 
2019-0907 (Del. Ch. filed Feb. 1, 2021), 2021 WL 392851 (explaining that only employees who re-
ported anonymously must remain redacted). See generally Public Version of the Verified Stockholder 
Derivative Complaint, supra note 17 (showing few redactions). The complaint provides enough facts 
to compare the allegations against Boeing with the allegations against Blue Bell and Clovis. Compare 
Public Version of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 23–28 (alleging 
both a lack of an existing oversight system and a failure to observe red flags about non-compliance), 
with Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (alleging that Blue Bell had no committee dedicated to overseeing 
food safety and ignored warning signs indicating Listeria), and In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 
(alleging that the Clovis board knew the clinical trial was not complying with reporting requirements 
and ignored such red flags). The defendants include Boeing’s board of directors, Boeing nominally, 
and Boeing officers. Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 11, 16. 
 209 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 57–58; see also Public Version 
of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 3. 
 210 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 58. The new engine position 
upset the 737 MAX’s aerodynamic stability, creating the potential for an engine stall because of the 
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intended the software to automatically correct the aircraft by adjusting the po-
sition of the plane’s nose.211 The complaint alleged that Boeing’s oversight 
failures included absent safety monitoring in board meetings, a pattern of in-
sufficient training manuals, implementation of the MCAS despite concerns, 
and inadequate pilot training with respect to intervening after the MCAS trig-
gered.212 The board made these decisions despite more than two hundred inci-
dent reports about the sensors that triggered MCAS were reported to the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA).213 The complaint further alleged that the 
                                                                                                                           
resulting interruption in airflow over the plane’s wings. Public Version of the Verified Stockholder 
Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 12. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System 
(MCAS) software usurped control from pilots, who could not manually correct for the issue as they 
would in prior models of the 737 plane. Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 
70. 
 211 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 58, 61. 
 212 Id. at 9, 26, 29, 43, 51, 56, 58–59. Testing the MCAS and training and informing pilots was 
important for the development of the 737 MAX for a myriad of reasons. See id. at 65 (noting that 
MCAS was not effectively described in the pilots’ foremost manual); see Public Version of the Veri-
fied Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 14, 15 (explaining the significance of not 
informing pilots of MCAS, and noting Boeing’s awareness of the MCAS design flaws). For example, 
Boeing initially designed the MCAS to rely on two angles of attack (AOA) sensors, but the final itera-
tion relied solely on one AOA sensor with a slower activation speed. Verified Amended Consolidated 
Complaint, supra note 19, at 6, 59; Public Version of the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, 
supra note 17, at 15. The lower activation speed increased the likelihood that the MCAS would en-
gage. Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 60; Public Version of the Verified 
Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 15. The warning system that indicated to the 
pilots that the MCAS became engaged did not reflect the use of only one AOA sensor; instead, the 
warning system reflected the earlier design, which had two AOA sensors. See Verified Amended 
Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 67–68 (noting that the warning light failed because it was 
designed to rely on two AOA sensors, and capturing Southwest Airlines’ outrage that an operative 
warning system was offered only as an add-on). The warning would only show pilots when two AOA 
sensors disagreed. Id. Consequently, the MCAS standard reliance on only one AOA sensor would 
never trigger the warning. Id.; see also Dominic Gates, Long Before First 737 MAX Crash, Boeing 
Knew a Key Sensor Warning Light Wasn’t Working, but Told No One, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.
seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/long-before-first-737-max-crash-boeing-knew-a-key-
sensor-warning-light-wasnt-working-but-told-no-one/ [https://perma.cc/2ZCD-XF4R] (May 5, 2019) 
(explaining the significance of the warning light problem). The predictable failure of the warning 
system, coupled with the automatic engagement of the MCAS software, made pilots’ unawareness of 
the changes to the MCAS especially problematic. See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, 
supra note 19, at 67–68, 81 (explaining the strangeness of “the plane automatically and repeatedly 
engaging an automated system while in manual flight mode” (emphasis added)); Public Version of the 
Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 13, 14 (noting that the software’s design 
took control away from the pilots, who could only disable MCAS if they knew of its existence). Re-
gardless of whether there were one or two AOA sensors, the MCAS software did not appear in the 
737 MAX’s Flight Crew Operations Manual. Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 
19, at 14. 
 213 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 60 (demonstrating the risk at-
tributed to the sensors because of their frequent failure); see also Curt Devine & Drew Griffin, Boeing 
Relied on Single Sensor for 737 Max That Had Been Flagged 216 Times to FAA, CNN, https://www.
cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-max-faa/index.html [https://perma.cc/MR45-4XCW] 
(Apr. 30, 2019). This Note does not extensively address the role of the FAA’s oversight failures. Con-
nor Raso, Boeing Crisis Illustrates Risk of Delegated Regulatory Authority, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1959 
board failed to investigate and monitor the safety risks in the 737 MAX’s de-
sign after the first crash.214 Applying Marchand to these facts, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery is likely to deny a motion to dismiss because Boeing oper-
ates as a monoline corporation in an industry that has a single primary regula-
tor imposing regulatory compliance standards.215 Subsection 1 of this Section 
evaluates whether the facts of In re the Boeing Co. satisfy the Marchand re-
quirement for a heavily regulated industry.216 Subsection 2 presents two ways 
to apply the monoline requirement in Marchand to In re the Boeing Co., con-
cluding that one interpretation would likely result in the court denying Boe-
ing’s motion to dismiss.217 Finally, Subsection 3 completes the Caremark claim 
analysis after concluding that Boeing meets both the monoline and heavily 
regulated prongs of Marchand.218 
                                                                                                                           
18, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/boeing-crisis-illustrates-risks-of-delegated-regulatory-
authority/ [https://perma.cc/8GKK-KBSU] (noting that the FAA certified the plane as safe). Nonethe-
less, the FAA’s delegation of compliance responsibilities could support the allegation that the board 
knew of its oversight responsibilities and consciously disregarded them. See id. (explaining that a key 
aspect of FAA’s certification related to the delegation of safety certification responsibility to Boeing); 
see also Andy Pasztor & Andrew Tangel, Boeing Withheld Information on 737 Model, According to 
Safety Experts and Others, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-withheld-information-
on-737-model-according-to-safety-experts-and-others-1542082575 [https://perma.cc/7E63-7GYM] 
(Nov. 13, 2018) (reporting that Boeing withheld information about the MCAS from pilots, safety 
experts, and the FAA); supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the role of the duty of good 
faith, and enhancing the argument that the board did not make a good faith effort to monitor safety 
risks). Alternatively, Boeing could use the FAA’s delegation of compliance controls to assign culpa-
bility to the FAA instead of Boeing. See Raso, supra (explaining that Congress authorized the FAA to 
delegate inspections to Boeing if the FAA monitored Boeing’s adherence to the inspection require-
ments). 
 214 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 4–5, 7–8, 31, 79 (noting that the 
board prioritized the company’s public relations before investigating whether the company had safety 
mechanisms in place). In 2020, the Delaware Chancery Court in Hughes v. Xiaoming Hu took issue 
with a board’s failure to address a critical compliance concern with urgency. C.A. No. 2019-0112, 
2020 WL 1987029, at *14–15, *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). There, the court denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, citing the Audit Committee’s failure to meet to discuss the issue until two months 
after the disclosure of the compliance concern. Id. at *14. Compare id. (denying a motion to dismiss 
even though a relevant committee existed to oversee compliance with financial reporting), with Veri-
fied Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 29 (noting that no relevant oversight com-
mittee existed until after both 737 MAX crashes). 
 215 See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (describing the signifi-
cance of regulatory compliance to Blue Bell’s monoline business); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Deriv-
ative Litig., No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (emphasizing the im-
portance of monoline operations and the extent of regulatory requirements in the relevant industry as 
important to determining whether a Caremark claim can survive a motion to dismiss). 
 216 See infra notes 219–231 and accompanying text. 
 217 See infra notes 232–254 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 255–264 and accompanying text. 
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1. Boeing Is Subject to an External Regulator in a Heavily Regulated 
Industry 
Boeing easily satisfies the heavily regulated factor established in 
Marchand because of the requirements imposed by the FAA.219 Akin to how 
consumers relied on the base assumption that Blue Bell ice cream was safe to 
eat, airlines and passengers relied on the base assumption that the 737 MAX 
jets were safe to fly.220 Such assumptions about safety result from confidence 
that products will not reach the market without adhering to regulatory regimes 
certifying such safety.221 Boeing needed the FAA’s certification to sell the 737 
MAX planes.222 Consequently, the FAA operated as a primary external regula-
tor essential to Boeing’s success.223 The role of the FAA as Boeing’s primary 
regulator is also apparent in a settlement agreement between Boeing and the 
FAA in 2015, where Boeing agreed to adjust its oversight mechanisms to more 
effectively comply with the FAA.224 A twelve million dollar fine accompanied 
this settlement agreement, indicating the stakes associated with the FAA’s regu-
lation and signaling Boeing’s knowledge of its inadequate oversight systems.225 
Boeing’s actions when dealing with the FAA during the 737 MAX devel-
opment and production demonstrate knowledge of oversight obligations and an 
intentional failure to adhere to them.226 For example, by Boeing’s own admis-
sion, the company purposefully hid information regarding the potential for the 
MCAS to trigger while flying at lower speeds.227 Instead, Boeing characterized 
                                                                                                                           
 219 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 810 (describing the FDA’s role in regulating Blue Bell); see also Ra-
so¸ supra note 213 (describing Boeing’s FAA compliance requirements). 
 220 Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (“Blue Bell can only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its 
products and were confident that its products were safe to eat.”), with Verified Amended Consolidated 
Complaint, supra note 19, at 24 (describing 737 MAX safety as integral to the product’s success). 
 221 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (explaining the relevance of compliance with the FDA as 
important to consumer confidence in the product); Aircraft, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.
gov/aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/9B9F-HAAF] (noting the purpose of the FAA’s certification process). 
 222 Raso, supra note 213 (discussing the FAA’s delegation of certification tasks to Boeing); see 
Aviation Safety (AVS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_
offices/avs/ [https://perma.cc/P7K9-2ZDL] (explaining the FAA’s responsibility for certifying “all 
operational and maintenance enterprises in domestic civil aviation” and “safety oversight”). 
 223 Aircraft, supra note 221. 
 224 Press Release, Ian Gregor, Fed. Aviation Admin., Boeing to Pay $6.6 Million in Penalties to 
FAA (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=25740 [https://
perma.cc/FLG5-RNF9]. 
 225 See id. The FAA imposed penalties under the 2015 agreement after asserting that the “compa-
ny managers did not sufficiently prioritize compliance with FAA regulations.” Id. 
 226 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 6 (remarking on Boeing’s mis-
characterization of how the MCAS operated in the 737 MAX planes). 
 227 Id. In January 2021, Boeing agreed to pay more than $2.5 billion dollars to settle the Depart-
ment of Justice’s criminal charge of conspiracy to commit fraud against the FAA during the FAA’s 
evaluation of the 737 MAX aircrafts. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Boeing Charged with 737 Max 
Fraud Conspiracy and Agrees to Pay Over $2.5 Billion (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-billion [https://perma.cc/2SPF-
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1961 
the MCAS as similar to an already-existing Boeing commercial plane, seeking 
expedited FAA approval.228 The fact that the FAA gave the certification, how-
ever, does not make the necessity of ensuring the corporation adhered to FAA 
regulatory requirements any less obvious. 229 The 2015 settlement agreement, 
combined with the requisite FAA certification, offer strong evidence that com-
plying with oversight obligations was essential to the success of the 737 MAX 
planes.230 Consequently, the court could infer that the directors knew of their 
oversight obligations.231 
2. Whether Boeing Meets the Monoline Prong of Marchand v. Barnhill 
The court’s analysis regarding whether Boeing’s organization constitutes 
a monoline corporation will likely be a closer issue and pivotal to resolving 
whether the court will dismiss the complaint.232 The 737 MAX constituted al-
most 70% of Boeing’s backlogged orders worth more than $400 billion dol-
lars.233 The commercial airplanes segment of Boeing depended on the 737 
                                                                                                                           
5A2G]. Significant evidence leading to a deferred prosecution agreement included Boeing’s admis-
sion to mislead and withhold information regarding the MCAS from the FAA. Id. A deferred prosecu-
tion agreement is when the prosecution charges a company with an offense, but if the subject of the 
prosecution complies with the agreement’s terms, then the prosecution agrees to drop the charges in 
the future. LOUIS M. BROWN ET AL., THE LEGAL AUDIT: CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION 
§ 2:25.50 (2020). 
 228 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 7. 
 229 See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 811, 824 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (explaining that the 
FDA reported food safety concerns to Blue Bell, but not factoring the FDA’s awareness of the prob-
lem into the inference that directors breached their oversight duty). The Delaware Supreme Court in 
Marchand emphasized that complying with some regulations imposed by the regulator does not pre-
clude successful pleadings of a Caremark claim. Id. at 823. 
 230 See Settlement Agreement Between the Federal Aviation Administration and the Boeing 
Company at 2, In re the Boeing Co. (Fed. Aviation Admin. Dec. 17, 2015) (affirming the importance 
of regulatory compliance); Aircraft, supra note 221 (explaining the FAA’s role in certifying airplane 
safety). 
 231 See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 57 (explaining Boeing’s reli-
ance on the 737 MAX planes to complete just under 70% of $400 billion orders); see also Marchand, 
212 A.3d at 822, 824 (describing food safety as so central that any oversight system made in good 
faith would monitor it as an essential compliance concern). 
 232 See General Information, BOEING, https://www.boeing.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/
B5RF-3Z8M] (describing itself as an aerospace company providing different services, including 
“commercial and military aircraft, satellites, weapons, electronic, and defense systems, launch sys-
tems, advanced information and communication systems, and performance-based logistics and train-
ing”). Arguably, this description could mean that Boeing is monoline because it only provides aero-
space products, or in the alternative, Boeing is arguably not monoline due to the differentiation of 
services. See id.; infra note 233 and accompanying text (explaining the four segments of Boeing). 
 233 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 57 (explaining that the 737 
MAX comprised 4,000 of the 5,900 Boeing commercial planes ordered and awaiting production). 
Although Boeing’s organization has four lines of business (i.e., commercial airplanes, defense, space, 
and security, global services, and capital financing solutions), the court will likely still deem Boeing a 
monoline corporation because Boeing almost exclusively produces aerospace equipment, including 
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MAX’s success without question.234 The monoline nature of Blue Bell allowed 
the court in Marchand to conclude that compliance with the regulator was suf-
ficiently mission critical to infer the board’s knowledge of its obligation to 
monitor it.235 There are two ways to apply the monoline analysis in Marchand 
to Boeing.236 The first interpretation assumes that whenever a segment of a 
corporation’s business itself is monoline, such that it focuses exclusively on 
one type of product, plaintiffs will more easily bring a Caremark claim against 
directors for failing to monitor compliance issues associated with that prod-
uct.237 The second ignores the presence of multiple segments or products and 
instead considers whether a particular product Boeing offers is so essential to 
the business that compliance issues with respect to that product become mis-
sion critical for the corporation, regardless of its other lines of business.238 The 
Delaware courts’ previous hesitation to find sufficiently alleged Caremark 
claims can offer insight into which of these interpretations will most likely ap-
ply.239 
The first interpretation would transform the historically difficult Care-
mark claim because it could apply whenever one product or type of product 
constitutes a large percentage of a segment of a corporation’s business.240 Alt-
hough this interpretation is credible based on the language of Marchand, it is 
                                                                                                                           
commercial and military aircraft and other related services. See id. at 11; General Information, supra 
note 232. 
 234 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57; see Public Version of 
the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 11 (“[T]he 737 MAX series of air-
craft is the primary profit-driver of Boeing’s Commercial Aircraft segment for the foreseeable future 
. . . .”); supra note 233 and accompanying text (explaining that when a company has one significant 
product, it supports an inference of the board’s knowledge). 
 235 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (defining Blue Bell as monoline because it makes a single 
product); Inter-mktg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. 2017-0030, 2020 WL 756965, at *11, *15 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (holding that pipeline integrity constituted a “mission-critical objective” even 
though the company operated three lines of business); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 
No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (describing Roci as the most promis-
ing drug “among [Clovis’s] drugs under development”). 
 236 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (describing Blue Bell as monoline). 
 237 See id. (relying on the role of one product within a corporation’s business to infer a critical 
compliance concern). 
 238 See Teamsters Loc. 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, C.A. No. 2019-0816, 2020 WL 
5028065, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Marchand despite the corporation’s increased complexity compared to Blue Bell and Clovis); In re 
Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (applying the monoline descriptor because one drug showed the most 
promise for the corporation even though the company was also developing other drugs). 
 239 See Haugh, supra note 6, at 613 (explaining the Delaware Supreme Court’s recognition of 
Caremark claims as one of the most difficult claims for an allegation of a breach of a fiduciary duty); 
Mitchell, supra note 6, at 248–49 (describing the challenges of asserting a Caremark claim). 
 240 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (inferring knowledge of a duty from Blue Bell’s monoline 
structure); Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57 (noting the signifi-
cance of the 737 MAX for Boeing’s Commercial Aircraft segment and overall revenue). 
2021] Marchand v. Barnhill’s Impact on the Duty of Oversight 1963 
unlikely.241 The court readily inferred intent in Marchand because Blue Bell’s 
singular product focus—ice cream—meant that food safety was so obvious 
that the board should have known to monitor it.242 Corporations often organize 
based on different product lines.243 For example, Boeing describes itself as an 
aerospace company providing different services, including planes for commer-
cial and military purposes, satellites, and defense services.244 With this organiza-
tion, each segment inherently becomes monoline.245 If these segments were suf-
ficiently monoline to satisfy Marchand, then plaintiffs may successfully allege 
a Caremark claim wherever a corporation organizes itself by product lines.246 
The monoline descriptor in the second interpretation considers the signif-
icance of one product to the corporation generally, despite the corporation’s 
other segments.247 Although this interpretation makes pleading Caremark 
claims more difficult when suing multi-faceted corporations, limiting 
Marchand in this manner is more consistent with courts’ typical dismissal of 
Caremark claims.248 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (emphasizing the court’s identification of food safety as Blue 
Bell’s essential compliance concerns). Relying on the presence of essential compliance concerns ra-
ther than the fact that Blue Bell sells one type of product would allow the court in Boeing to interpret 
Marchand to allow a knowledge inference wherever a corporation has an essential compliance con-
cern. Id. The Boeing Complaint specifically pleads that plane safety is “mission critical” to Boeing. 
Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 24, 79–80. 
 242 Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809. 
 243 Corporate Structure, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/
knowledge/finance/corporate-structure/ [https://perma.cc/6LHS-E3ZD]; Arthur H. Walker & Jay W. 
Lorsch, Organizational Choice: Product v. Function, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 1968), https://hbr.org/
1968/11/organizational-choice-product-vs-function [https://perma.cc/5NBK-6D4X]. 
 244 See General Information, supra note 232 (listing the services Boeing provides). 
 245 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (defining monoline). 
 246 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (explaining that food safety was Blue Bell’s primary compli-
ance concern because Blue Bell only produced a food product). 
 247 See Inter-mktg. Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. 2017-0030, 2020 WL 756965, at *15 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (demonstrating an interpretation of monoline that focuses on the importance of one 
product within a corporation by identifying pipeline integrity as an essential compliance concern de-
spite a more complex corporate structure); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-
0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (noting that the potential of one drug was 
enough to create an essential compliance concern despite the ongoing development of other drugs). 
 248 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (describing Blue Bell as monoline because it sells only one 
product—custard-based foods); In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (explaining that Roci is the 
drug that showed the most promise out of all Clovis products). But see Public Version of the Verified 
Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 11 (describing the 737 MAX as critical to the 
success of Boeing’s commercial airlines segment, but not addressing its importance across Boeing 
more generally). After the benefit of records requests, the Boeing Complaint more effectively captured 
the importance of the 737 MAX to Boeing overall by explaining the significance of the commercial 
airplanes segment. See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57 (empha-
sizing that “80% of [Boeing’s] annual net earnings” stemmed from commercial airplanes, and noting 
that the 737 MAX contributed to a huge percent of the commercial airplanes segment earnings); see 
also Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (acknowledging commentators’ desire to broaden a Caremark 
claim’s reach). 
1964 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1925 
Due to the significance of the 737 MAX to Boeing, generally, a court ap-
plying the second interpretation will likely find that Boeing is monoline, de-
spite the corporation’s other segments.249 Although ice cream was the basis of 
all of Blue Bell’s products in Marchand, the 737 MAX comprised 4,000 of the 
5,900 backlogged jetliner orders.250 Additionally, the application of Marchand 
in In re Clovis supports the interpretation of the monoline qualifier to not pre-
clude corporations with other products in development.251 The lung cancer 
drug in In re Clovis showed the most promise of all drugs in Clovis’s pipeline, 
and the ongoing clinical trial actively elevated the importance of compliance 
with FDA regulations for the product to move forward.252 Similarly, Boeing’s 
commercial airplanes division comprised approximately 80% of the company’s 
annual net earnings, such that the 737 MAX’s projected contribution of 70% of 
the backlogged orders within this division made the 737 MAX an extremely 
promising product for Boeing.253 The importance of the 737 MAX to Boeing 
coupled with the obvious necessity of complying with Boeing’s primary regu-
lator—the FAA—suggest that the 737 MAX’s safety was so essential to Boe-
ing’s overall success that the court should find that the board knew of its duty 
to oversee its safety compliance.254 
3. Conclusions After Determining That Boeing Meets Both Marchand v. 
Barnhill Prongs 
Finding that Boeing satisfies the monoline requirement articulated in 
Marchand would empower the court to acknowledge that the board not only 
                                                                                                                           
 249 See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57 (explaining the role 
of the Commercial Airplanes segment within Boeing’s business structure); see also Inter-mktg. Grp., 
2020 WL 756965, at *15 (reasoning that pipeline integrity was an essential compliance concern). 
 250 Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (emphasizing that Blue Bell sold one type of product), 
with Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57 (noting that the 737 MAX 
orders increased to 5,000 after its launch, comprising the majority of Boeing aircraft orders). 
 251 In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (noting the existence of other drugs in development at 
Clovis, but identifying Roci as the drug showing the most promise). The In re Clovis opinion does not 
provide information regarding the position of other Clovis drugs within the drug development pipe-
line, but the court focused on Roci because it showed that the corporation’s success depended on it. 
Id.; see also Pipeline Overview, CLOVIS ONCOLOGY, https://clovisoncology.com/pipeline/pipeline-
overview/ [https://perma.cc/8H9S-CEGY] (listing multiple Clovis products). 
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oversight of “regulatory compliance risk” in addition to business risk, especially where the corpora-
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Marchand, 212 A3d at 824)). 
 253 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57; supra note 248 and 
accompanying text (explaining how a corporation with multiple segments can still satisfy the mono-
line requirement). 
 254 See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 56–57 (describing the im-
portance of the 737 MAX to Boeing’s commercial aircraft line of business); Aviation Safety, supra 
note 222 (articulating the FAA’s safety requirements). 
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must meet the oversight requirements established in In re Caremark but also 
must meet the more onerous burden of being aware of compliance risks.255 Af-
ter meeting the monoline requirement, the plaintiffs in In re the Boeing Co. can 
more easily prove that the board failed to pay the special attention to safety 
compliance that the corporation’s monoline business requires.256 For example, 
the complaint detailed that the board’s records showed no evidence of an 
emergency meeting concerning the first crash, a substantive safety discussion, 
or a committee tasked with specific oversight concerns.257 The complaint fur-
ther alleged that Boeing’s board created its first committee dedicated to over-
seeing the safe design, production, and maintenance of commercial aircraft 
after the two 737 MAX crashes.258 
When considering In re the Boeing Co. in the context of Marchand and In 
re Clovis, the Boeing board will likely have difficulty defending its alleged 
oversight failures.259 In Marchand, the FDA reports of food safety issues suffi-
ciently constituted warning signs that the board should pay special attention to 
a compliance issue central to its products’ success.260 Similarly, in In re Clovis, 
the court concluded that the clinical trial’s reliance on unconfirmed responses, 
despite the FDA requirement to rely exclusively on confirmed responses, suffi-
ciently demonstrated the board’s ignorance of red flags.261 Boeing not only had 
more than two hundred incident reports concerning the MCAS software, but it 
also had a plane crash in which 189 people died.262 It is difficult to imagine a 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (analyzing Marchand to mean directors’ good 
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 256 See Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 50, 88 (alleging that Boe-
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 257 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 29–31, 50, 88, 102. 
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 260 212 A.3d at 809 (explaining that management knew of “yellow and red flags about food safe-
ty”). 
 261 2019 WL 4850188, at *5 (acknowledging that Clovis’s board knew that the FDA would not 
accept unconfirmed responses). 
 262 Verified Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 19, at 43, 60; Public Version of the 
Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 17, at 2 (describing the first plane crash as 
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Boeing knew a sensor warning light was not working); supra note 212 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the importance of the AOA sensors in relation to the MCAS and the safety of the 737 MAX). 
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more obvious red flag signaling a safety problem.263 Consequently, assuming 
that the court determines Boeing fits the monoline descriptor identified in 
Marchand, the court will likely find that the directors face substantial likelihood 
of liability for a breach of their oversight responsibility and deny the company’s 
motion to dismiss.264 
C. Assessing the Strength of a Caremark Claim Post-Marchand v. Barnhill 
Two stages of analysis are important to assessing the likelihood of a 
Caremark claim’s success.265 The corporation must first meet the two threshold 
requirements established in Marchand: (1) a monoline business, that is (2) sub-
ject to a primary regulator in a heavily regulated industry.266 If the company 
fits within these parameters, the court can then infer that the board knew of its 
oversight obligations because such obligations are essential for the business to 
succeed.267 This inference then facilitates plaintiffs’ survival of a motion to 
dismiss where directors do not react to red flags indicating potential failure of 
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regulatory compliance.268 As a result of this inference, the court can assume the 
board consciously acted with such disregard.269 After analyzing Marchand as it 
applied in In re Clovis and will likely apply in In re the Boeing Co., the follow-
ing factors are critical in determining whether a claim has the criteria to allege 
a (1) monoline corporation, (2) in a heavily regulated industry, and (3) direc-
tors’ failure of oversight.270 
First, a corporation will likely meet the monoline parameters outlined in 
Marchand if it produces one type of product.271 Additionally, where one prod-
uct’s success is so critical for the corporation’s business model that the court 
can infer that the board knew meeting the product’s regulatory requirements 
was necessary for the business’s future, the corporation will likely meet mono-
line as described in Marchand.272 Second, when one, primary, external regula-
tor imposes those regulatory requirements, the court will likely find that the cor-
poration is in a heavily regulated industry.273 Finally, assuming the corporation 
meets both the monoline and heavily regulated prongs, if the plaintiffs allege that 
the board ignored warning signs about the product’s failure to meet regulatory 
requirements, then the complaint will likely survive a motion to dismiss.274 
CONCLUSION 
Through emphasizing Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc.’s (Blue Bell) 
monoline business model, the Delaware Supreme Court found a way to infer 
intent and find a breach of the directors’ duty to exercise oversight responsi-
bilities in good faith. The good faith requirement was necessary for the 
Marchand v. Barnhill 2019 decision despite the Delaware courts’ explicit 
treatment of good faith as a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty. Good 
faith allowed the court to factor in egregiousness of conduct—conduct so ob-
viously opposed to the stockholders’ interest that exculpation of directors can-
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not stand. The Delaware court in Marchand imputed this culpability by em-
phasizing Blue Bell’s monoline structure, concluding that the board implicitly 
knew the essential role food safety played in the corporation’s success. Both 
Marchand and In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation involved in-
dustries capable of causing irreparable harm if not properly regulated by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Whether a corporation is monoline and 
heavily regulated informs how a court identifies mission critical compliance 
concerns and can in turn infer the board’s conscious disregard of a known duty. 
The court’s willingness to provide more access to successful Caremark claims 
in these circumstances served to enforce directors’ duty of oversight more ef-
fectively without risking the protection of corporate innovation the business 
judgment presumption affords. 
Blue Bell’s Listeria crisis resulted in fatalities that undoubtedly devastat-
ed families. Marchand cannot bring those individuals back, but these losses led 
to a change in Delaware courts’ understanding of directors’ fiduciary duty of 
oversight that will hopefully save lives in the future. Through Marchand, the 
Delaware Supreme Court recognized that some corporations should be more 
sensitive to overseeing their compliance obligations. The tragic death of 346 
people in a six-month period made the importance of effective oversight of the 
safety of The Boeing Company’s aircraft clear. Texans can be proud of Blue 
Bell again because Marchand not only laid a foundation for the derivative ac-
tion in In re the Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation to survive pre-trial dismissal, 
but it also identified factors essential to a strong Caremark claim. Where a 
corporation is monoline and subject to one primary external regulator, directors 
are on notice that their shareholders, and consumers more generally, rely on 
their oversight of essential compliance concerns. 
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